University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Copyright, Fair Use, Scholarly Communication,
etc.

Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln

2018

Cyber Security and Risk Society: Estonian Discourse on Cyber
Risk and Security Strategy
Lauren Kook
University of Tartu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/scholcom
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons, Digital Communications and Networking
Commons, and the Scholarly Communication Commons

Kook, Lauren, "Cyber Security and Risk Society: Estonian Discourse on Cyber Risk and Security Strategy"
(2018). Copyright, Fair Use, Scholarly Communication, etc.. 135.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/scholcom/135

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Copyright, Fair Use,
Scholarly Communication, etc. by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Faculty of Social Sciences
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
School of Slavonic and East European Studies

Lauren Kook

CYBER SECURITY AND RISK SOCIETY:
ESTONIAN DISCOURSE ON CYBER RISK AND SECURITY STRATEGY

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Eoin McNamara

Tartu, Estonia
21st May, 2018

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources
and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

.........................................................................
/ signature of author /

The defence will take place on at ......................... / time /
................................................... / address / in auditorium number ...................... / number /

Opponent ................................................... / name / (................ / academic degree /),
..................................

/

position

/

ABSTRACT
The main aim of this thesis is to call for a new analysis of cyber security which departs from the
traditional security theory. I argue that the cyber domain is inherently different in nature, in that
it is lacking in traditional boundaries and is reflexive in nature. Policy-makers are aware of these
characteristics, and in turn this awareness changes the way that national cyber security strategy is
handled and understood. These changes cannot be adequately understood through traditional
understanding of security, as they often are, without missing significant details. Rather,
examining these changes through the lens of Ulrich Beck’s risk society theory allows us to fully
understand these changes. To support my argument, I analyze statements made by Estonian
policy-makers and stakeholder, demonstrating that the way that they understand the nature of the
cyber domain and the drafting and handling of cyber security as a result of this understanding is
best

rationalized

through

a

risk

society

framework.
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5
INTRODUCTION
The topic of this thesis will be the understanding and perception of risk and security by policymakers in cyber security and how it translates to strategy and policy. It will focus on how the
notion of security is different in the cyber domain, shifting from a more threat-centric view to a
risk-centric view. It argues so through the conceptual lens of Risk Society, the sociological
theory put forward by Ulrich Beck in the 1990’s. The thesis will analyze cyber security through
the specific case of Estonia, with particular focus on Estonian discourse of policy-makers and
stakeholders.
In today’s day and age, ‘cyber security’ is become and increasingly important and vogue topic.
The topic of cyber security departs for many traditional discussions on security, along with the
politics and policies that follow this discussion. My research aims to address exactly what
changes have occurred in discourse at the policy-making level, with Estonia as a case study.
Specifically I wish to address how Estonian policy makers understand and conceptualize cyber
risk and how this influences their decisions. The concepts of risk and security have become
increasingly intertwined and prevalent in the past two decades as risk comes forward as a main
theme. There are many conceptualizations of the emerging risk-security nexus, but amongst the
most influential is Ulrich Beck’s concept of risk society. This change calls for an new analysis of
the understanding of risk by policy-makers. My analysis of the conceptualization of cyber risk by
policy makers will be through the lens of risk society.
This research hopes to fill a gap in the field of international relations in relation to the concept of
risk society connected to cyber security. The understanding and treatment of security in the cyber
domain is significantly different to that in traditional domains. This difference has not been
adequately explored, and cannot be through analyzing the cyber domain and cyber security
strategy through our normal conventional understanding without missing significant and key
points. These difference can be understood through a lens of risk society, and we can understand
the nature of the cyber domain, and the conceptualization of risk and security by policy-makers
and how it effects strategy. Ulrich Beck’s risk society theory has be influential and has been used
in understanding modern warfare, the “transformation of war” debate, and policy decisions and
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policy making. However, the concept has yet to be applied to the cyber domain in a
comprehensive way. This thesis will explore the nature of the cyber domain through risk society
theory, and explain the departure in treatment and understanding of security in the cyber domain.
My main research question is how Estonian policy-makers and stakeholder understand and
conceptualize risk in relation to cyber security, and what effect this has on the Estonian National
Cyber Security Strategy. This research question had two sub-queries. The first asks how the
cyber domain is different to other domains in regards to security. The second is what is the
process that policy-makers go through in order to address these differences, and what are the
results in the strategies themselves. I aim to understand the thought process behind cyber security
strategy and policies of Estonia, and identify how the notion of security within the cyber sector is
different to other sectors, and how security had changed in recent years.
In this thesis I argue that the understand and treatment of security in the cyber domain has
changed from what we have traditional seen in terms of national security. This department from
traditional understanding of security translates into different handling of cyber security strategy.
The cyber domain in which cyber security strategy seeks to secure is fundamentally different to
other domains, and there is a keen grasp on this difference by policy-makers and by society as a
whole. This change in understanding cannot be adequately understood by analyzing it through
traditional notions of security. This change calls for a new lens of understanding. Ulrich Beck’s
theory on Risk Society and New Modernity can help us understand how the understanding of
security has changed in regards to the cyber domain, including multi-sector involvement and
cultural understanding and perception of risk. I present Estonia as a case study, particularly
discussing and analyzing Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders discourse on risk and security
in regards to the cyber domain in order to demonstrate that these changes to cyber security are
best understood through a lens of risk society.
I have chosen Estonia as a case study due to the fact that it has one of, if not the most, mature
cyber security strategies and cultures. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, Estonia began to
develop its cyber capabilities and e-governance methods early on, allowing the government to
get a head start as well as foster knowledge and esteem regarding the cyber domain. Secondly,
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the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonian cyber space prompted a frenzy into action regarding cyber
security, pushing Estonia into the spotlight and forcing the state to bulk up on its cyber security.
Thirdly, due to both of these reasons, Estonia has established itself as an formidable expert on egovernance, e-solutions, and cyber security, which in turn has brought expert and research
capability back to Estonia.
An emphasis on cyber capabilities and e-governance was establish early on in the priorities of
the Estonian government, following re-independence. One stated reason for this emphasis was
for cost-saving measures. Digital services save money in a number of ways, including personnel
and decreased need of physical location. It has been reported that 2% of the GDP has been saved
by going digital1. Early implementation of digital solutions had not only given Estonia a head
start, but potentially also saved it from growing privacy debates2. As the rest of Europe and the
world are soon to follow, they will no doubt face challenges regarding data sharing. However,
Estonia has skipped this step, and e-ID and cross-sector leveling have already been implemented.
The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia brought world-wide attention to the potential risks of going
digital, and spurred a reaction to bolster cyber security. In Estonia, this increased the awareness
of the both the weaknesses in cyber security and risks that followed digitalization. The attacked
prompted Estonia to continue to expand and improve cyber security, both from a strategic and
logistical point of view. However, the 2007 attacks had another consequence, which was that it
brought Estonia to the forefront of the international cyber security scene. Other countries became
aware of Estonia’s digitalization, and they also became aware of the risks. The increased
attention to Estonia, particular the reaction of the government, granted Estonia world wide
attention.
As a result, Estonia not only had the advanced e-solutions and the developed cyber security
strategy that culminates in a mature cyber security culture, but it has the international recognition
as such. Estonia has establish itself as an expert on e-government and cyber security, which in
1

Statistic available at https://e-estonia.com/wp-content/uploads/updated-facts-estonia.pdf
There are a number of factors to consider when discussing why Estonia developed digitally, which are beyond the
2
There are a number of factors to consider when discussing why Estonia developed digitally, which are beyond the
scope of this paper. For more information see Areng, Liina “Liliputian States in Digital Affairs and Cyber Security”
2

8
turn has attracted experts to Estonia. Estonia plays host to several security organizations, most
notably the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCD COE). Significant
documents such as the Tallinn Manual with suggestions, commentary, on international cyber
security have been produced by experts in Estonia. All of this mean that Estonia is the best
choice for a case study on cyber security, as it is the most mature and well-developed.
Data for my empirical research will be collected through interviews, which will allow me to get
an understanding on the discourse surrounding cyber security strategy and understanding of risk
and security. Interviewees will come from both the public and private sectors, including
government officials, researchers at academic institutions, and experts other security
organizations . This will provide a well-rounded understanding of all discourse that influences
cyber security strategy in Estonia.
Interviews will be semi-structured, consisting of core questions slightly tailored to the
individuals expertise or role. Questions will be focused on the interviewees understanding of
cyber security, particularly how it is different to other forms of security, and underlying concepts
of strategy. These questions will be designed to test for understanding and awareness of risk that
is present in a risk society. There will also be an emphasis on the role of other sectors in cyber
security, and the nature of policies, i.e. whether they are proactive or reactive.
My research scope is limited in two ways. Firstly, it is limited to the Estonian perspective, how
Estonia deals with and perceives risks. Secondly, it is limited to the cyber domain. These two
limitations will focus my research. A potential difficulty I may face arises from the unavoidable
nature of the cyber domain, which is global and does not have borders. Even though my research
is limited to Estonia, it can only be limited to Estonian perspective given the global nature of
cyber risks. This has the potential to make it difficult to distinguish between types of risks.
Furthermore, a main characteristic of risk society is that is contains many unforeseen and
unintended consequences, which also makes risk difficult to both quantify and predict. However,
by focusing on the Estonian perspective, the keyword being perspective, this obstacle can be
avoided. The theoretical characteristics of risk can be accepted, and focus is put on which risks
that policy makers emphasize.
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It is worth noting to limitations of Ulrich Becks’ risk society, which is used as a theoretical
foundation for this paper. It is a macro sociological theory which some have argued is to vague.
This makes the application of risk society both easier and trickier. It is easier because it can be
applied to many different areas and many different types of research, and it’s macro nature
allows for much interpretation. However, this presents some issues, namely that it is easier to
manipulate to fit research and arguments, and may be stretched to unrelated areas. This paper
addresses this issue and attempts to avoid fitting cyber security into an ill-fitting box by
analyzing and describing cyber security first, then going on to discuss the application of risk
society. In this way I hope to avoid oversimplification of cyber security conceptualization and
address all the complexities and concepts that characterize it.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
With the growing emphasis on cyber in discussion of national security and international politics,
there has come much discussion of it in the field of international relations. The treatment of the
cyber domain and of cyber security has ranged from more practical discussions on how to treat it
in a legal sense, to theoretical discussions on different frameworks which is best to understand
the treatment of cyber in the political arena. The one thing that all literature on the cyber domain
and cyber security seems to agree on is the fact that both are unique and require a special
treatment.
On the more practical side, legal scholars discuss emergence of the cyber domain as a major
legal field in both national and international law and the difficulties that we face as we try to set
up a framework. The Tallinn Manual, an immense study on the complexities of how international
law applies to cyberspace, has been published by the CCD COE with a second edition soon to be
published. Less specific and analytical articles have also been published by the CCD COE,
which seek to clarify cyberspace as a domain or expand on discussion of cyber law (Schmitt and
Vihul 2014). In “A Legal View on Outer Space and Cyberspace: Similarities and Differences”,
Katrin Nyman Metcalf compares the nature of cyberspace to outer space, arguing that the two
domain are “both cases dealing with areas that appear borderless, which means that traditional
legal principles and rules based…specific borders, cannot apply or at least will be difficult to
apply” (Nyman Metcalf 2018: 1). On the other hand, Alžbeta Bajerová conducts a more practical
SWOT analysis of NATO including cyberspace as a new domain of operations, with a more
traditional treatment of threats but a emphasis on cooperation between both sectors and states
(Bajerova 2017: 10).
More theoretical treatments of cyber security also exist in the literature with a large range of
viewpoints and arguments. Liina Areng analyzes the growth of the importance of cyber security
to Estonia, offering Small State Theory as an explanation of why Estonia has become a leader in
cyber security internationally. In “Liliputian States in Digital Affairs and Cyber Security”, she
argues that Estonia’s ‘small state’ attributes which often excludes states from being heavy lifters
in the international sphere, such as its small population and relatively new government, have in
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turn allowed it to become a shining example of a digital state (Areng 2014). Lene Hansen and
Helen Nissenbaum offer a completely different perspective on cyber security through
securitization theory (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). They argue that “‘Cyber security’ can, in
short, be seen as ‘computer security’ plus ‘securitization’”. They also discuss the difficulty of
identifying specific traits or focuses of cyber security, including threats and referent objects, with
much emphasis placed on the “wealth of referent objects”. Also using Estonia as a case study,
Hansen and Nissenbaum examine the security language behind the securitizing of cyberspace in
Estonia after the 2007 attacks, ultimately stating that securitization has been partially successful
(ibid: 1170).
There is a huge array of studies put out by the CCD COE on cyber security. In addition to the
article already mentioned and the Tallinn Manual, the Centre also has published reports on the
national cyber security structures of many nations, both NATO and non-NATO, providing in an
depth look at the strategies in a structured and logical manner. “Ten Rules for Cyber Security” is
another article published by the Centre which underscores ten different rule nations ought to
follow when thinking about cyber security strategy . These ten rules are more abstract in nature
and focus on broad concepts and ideas states ought to keep in mind, such as the ‘duty to care’
and the ‘access to information’ rules (Tikk 2011). On a more practical level, the Centre also
published National Cyber Security Strategy guidelines, which provide more in depth and more
concrete suggestions for states when actually drafting strategy.
The literature on risk society is the opposite to that of cyberspace and security, in that it spans
across different security topics and sector, but focuses on a single theoretical approach. Risk
Society was initially theorized by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in the early 1990’s, and he
continued to expand and explore this theory alongside Anthony Giddens. Beck and Giddens own
work on Risk Society is extensive and spans nearly two decades. This theory proves incredibly
influential as is crossed disciplinary borders and permeated the literature on international politics
and security studies. Beck’s initial work, which lays the foundation for the key concepts such as
reflexive modernization, presence of the future, and the boomerang effect, spanned across many
different topics, including environmental risk and terrorism. The literature on risk society is
extensive.
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Risk Society theory has been applied to many different specific areas of security, by both Beck
and by others. In “The ‘Transformation of War’ Debate: Through the Looking Glass of Ulrich
Beck’s World Risk Society”, Yee-Kuang Heng argues specifically that risk society provides a
unique and superior framework with which to understand the changing nature of war. He focuses
on four elements: ‘reflexive modernisation, the globalisation of risk, active anticipation and risk
society’s minimalist ethos’. He uses the United States as a case study, analyzing statements and
documents regarding attitude and decisions made by the government. Heng argues that risk
society allows us to better understand both the changing nature of war and how states make
decisions regarding war. Stefan Elbe briefly analyzes the HIV/AIDS epidemic through a risk
society lens, putting particular emphasis on the presence of the future in HIV/AIDS discourse.
He also links the concept of the ‘dangers of modernization’, arguing that the spread of
HIV/AIDS has been made possible by the modern advances in transportation and increasingly
globalized world (Elbe 2008: 10). Risk society has also been applied to the discussion on
terrorism by several authors, included Beck himself (Beck 2002).
These two literatures coincide in the discussion on risk and cyberspace put forth by Ronald J.
Deibart and Rafal Rohozinski. In their article “Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of
Cyberspace Security” they illuminate the gap in the discussion on risk in relation to cyber
security, stating that while the academic and politicians alike agree on the risk to cyberspace,
they ignore the concept of risks through cyberspace. They differentiate the two types of risk and
treat them separately (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 24). Deibart and Rohozinski focus on the
nature of risks themselves rather than apply the risk society framework in a comprehensive way,
as Heng does with war.
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CHAPTER 1: CYBERSPACE AS A DOMAIN
This section seeks to describe cyberspace as a domain and lay out the characteristics which set it
apart. It begins with defining and describing the key terms and concepts that are used in the
discussion on ‘cyber’. It then goes on to discuss the borderless nature of the cyber domain and it
effects. The nature of threats and risks which are present in the cyber domain, the actors
involved, including the role of the private sector, and the non-physical nature of cyberspace is
discussed in this section. Next it discusses the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity, then the role
of cyber deterrence. Finally, it describes the proactive nature of cyber security strategy and
policy and concludes with overarching themes.
1.1 Defining Cyber
There are many definitions floating around regarding the concept of ‘cyber’. Most nations
employ their own definitions, understandings, and boundaries to what cyberspace is as a domain,
and what ‘cyber security’ means to them. Some nations have much wider concepts of what cyber
security pertains to, i.e. how far national cyberspace extends to and where they can draw lines. I
will discuss some of the difference in these definitions and the reasons for them, followed by a
more conceptual discussion on what the cyberspace is, in itself and as a domain. I will also
discuss the question of ‘what is cyber security’ from a conceptual point of view.
Firstly, we ask ‘what is cyberspace?’ Society often simply answers that cyberspace is ‘the
internet’ and gives it no more thought, but if thinking about cyber from a security point of view,
and if viewing it as its own domain, this is not clear enough. Most nations do employ more
complex definitions for strategy purposes, including both the non-physical aspects as well as the
physical aspects to describe what ‘cyberspace’ is. Here the definition comes from the Tallinn
Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. ‘Cyberspace’ is:
‘The environment formed by physical and non-physical components, characterized by the
use of computers and electro-magnetic spectrum, to store, modify and exchange data
using computer networks’.
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Thus when we refer to ‘cyberspace’, we are talking about a vast interconnected system that
encompasses the non-physical, i.e. the internet, and the actual physical systems which create this
space. Cyberspace as a domain is a slightly more complicated matter due to this dual nature.
Deibart and Rohozinski state that “in strategic terms, cyberspace is accepted now as a domain
equal to land, air, sea, and space” but that it cannot be treated the same because of it is entirely
human-made (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). Because of its non-physical nature, which
makes up the majority of the domain, it is much more difficult to draw borders in cyberspace
than it is in airspace or on land. As we will see later, this has a serious impact on the way in
which cyber security functions.
But what is cyber security? Again, nations employ many different definitions in strategies and
documents, ranging in complexity. For example, Norway employs the simple definition as cyber
security is the “protection of data and systems connected to the Internet”3. Estonia, on the other
hand, has a more in depth definition:
“It is an essential precondition for the securing of cyberspace that every operator of a
computer, computer network or information system realizes the personal responsibility of
using the data and instruments of communication at his or her disposal in a purposeful
and appropriate manner. Estonia’s cyber security strategy seeks primarily to reduce the
inherent vulnerabilities of cyberspace in the nation as a whole.” (CCD COE)
This definition is more complex and encompasses some of the key ideas of cyber security which
will be important in this paper.
However, a definition put forward by national strategies are not sufficient to conceptualize what
cyber security is from a security studies point of view. If we think about the very basic concept
of security as ‘absence of threat towards acquired values’, we begin to see an potential issue with
using traditional notions of what security is when pertaining to the cyber domain. We can indeed
say that the acquired value being a digitalized state. We can also identify the referent object as
3

This definition is very close to the common definition of information security: ‘the preservation of the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information’ (ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 27002: code of practice for information
security management 2005). However, information security and cyber security should not be treated as
interchangeable. For further elaboration see Von Somns.
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national cyberspace, though this is where it begins to get fuzzy due to the difficulties in drawing
succinct border in relation to ‘national cyberspace’. Hansen and Nissenbaum discuss the
complexities of naming a distinct referent object, instead stating that there is a multitude of
referent objects, including the internet, society, infrastructures, and many others (Hansen and
Nissenbaum 2009: 1157).
However, this overlooks the nature of the cyber domain, namely that there are inherent risks, or
systemic risks, that can not be eliminated, only managed. Cyber security is the ongoing
management of risks to and from cyberspace. Nations cannot ‘secure’ cyberspace for a number
of reasons, elaborated further on, but must practice management of a domain of “constant
transformation and a high degree of complexity” (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). By
understanding cyber security as the management of risks, we acknowledge the nature of the
cyber domain as it exists, and, I argue, we better understand the decisions policy-maker take and
the key themes behind cyber strategy.
Lastly, I define and discuss the term ‘cyber society’, which is a society which is dependent on
the use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT). A cyber society has digitalized
and incorporated ICT into its society, including government functions and everyday life such as
banking, so that it cannot function without it. For a cyber society, cyber security is of utmost
importance since it is reliant on cyberspace as its main domain of business of every sort. Not
every state which employs ICT is a cyber society; there is a wide spectrum in terms of the degree
of digitalization and reliance on ICT in modern society.

1.2 Borderless Nature of Cyberspace/domain
One of the key characteristics of the cyber domain is its lack of borders, which is expressed in
several ways. The most obvious way in which cyberspace is borderless is the actually lacking of
physical boundaries, at least in the traditional way we conceive of it in security. Traditional
notions of security, specifically national security, are tied to territoriality. Indeed, national
security depends on the integrity of a nation’s borders. However, cyber security is primarily the
securing of cyber space, which, while it has of course physical roots, mostly consists of the
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internet and things that we do not think of as being physical. Cyberspace is a separate domain in
itself from physically territory (land, sea, air), one which does not have defined national ends and
beginning (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). The non-physical nature of the cyber domain take
away one of the safeguards that a state has in conventional security domains such as land of air,
which is strategic depth. While kinetic warfare is limited by space and physical obstacles, cyber
weapons are not (ibid).
This lack of borders is because of the nature of the cyber realm in the first place. The most
prominent feature of cyberspace, and of the internet, is it interconnectedness (Nyman Metcalf
2018: 1; 11). The internet connects the government, the private sector, and civilians. Most
importantly, it transcends national borders (ibid 3). It is difficult to distinguish national cyber
systems and infrastructure, however to draw borders in ‘cyberspace’ is nearly impossible.
Citizens in one country can use servers in other nations, pass and receive information to
individuals across borders, and (Areng 2014: 5). The sheer number of international interactions
which are available to individuals in cyberspace cannot be accounted for in this paper. The point
is that it is impossible to draw succinct and definite boundaries in cyberspace, and this has
significant consequences for cyber security. It becomes more difficult, as I have stated, to define
what cyber security entails in a national security sense (ibid 2). This is seen by the fact that many
governments have different definitions and concepts of cyber security, which results in different
national strategies.
Because of this, national cyber security of any nation depends on the security of other nations as
well. In this way, cyber security strategy cannot have concrete and inflexible ideas about what is
or isn’t national cyberspace, since cyberspace is so interconnected. This aspect is highlighted in
the NCSS, which states national cyber securities are intertwined, and because of this, cyber
security strategies must consider the international aspects.
The lack of common understanding in terms of what cyber security is and how a national cyber
security strategy should entail can cause fragmentation in a domain where mutual understanding
is necessary. If one nation has the understanding that cyber security entails that they only protect
ICT, and its neighbor believes that cyber security means making sure that cyber actions of all
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sectors be secure, this can jeopardize the cyber security of both nations, as international
cooperation is vital in cyber security. Part of this difficulty has already been seen during the
attacks on Estonia in 2007, which prompted much discussion on the triggering of Article 5 and
whether cyber attack qualified. Article 5 states that allies are bound to defend one another in the
case of aggression. However, debates over whether or not cyber attacks count as aggression, and
if so, which attacks count and which do not, continued in the aftermath and continue to this day
(Schmitt and Vihul 2014: 15). The lack of physical harm, though cyber attacks can result in this,
makes it difficult to say (ibid 18). In addition to the complexities that cyber attacks have
presented in terms of treaties, the new focus on cyber security has sparked a multitude of
discussions on cyber law, including indetermination of jurisdiction based on the borderless-ness
of cyber space as a domain.
Another way in which the cyber domain can be described as being borderless is in regards to
threat and risk. In the cyber domain it is both difficult to detect threats and to identify
perpetrators when an attack has occurred. This is the case both in large scale attacks such
breaches in governmental systems, or in smaller instances such as cyber crime. In the case of
large scale attacks, it has been proven that it is very difficult to distinguish whom the aggressor
is, and even more difficult to prove it, as it had been in the case of the 2007 attack on Estonia
(O’Connell 2012: 152). Even if a state sanctions cyber attacks on another state, they may do so
through either individuals or organized groups which have no association with the government ,
‘hacktivists’, and who might not even reside in either country, thus the physical location of an
aggressor does not matter in some instances (Areng 2014: 5). The borderless nature of
cyberspace allows cyber attacks to be conducted by anyone who has a certain skill set, which
states do not have a monopoly on. In such cases, even if a state is believed to have funded or
sanctioned an attack, it is very difficult to find proof. Large scale attacks need not be state
sanctioned at all, however. ‘Hacktivist’ groups grow in number, and terrorist groups have
attempted to use cyber tactics as well. These groups have the potential to cause great damage to a
nation’s functioning cyberspace.
Beyond large scale attacks, cyber security also entails the safety of day-to-day functions of
cyberspace. In fact, cyber crime is often considered the biggest threat to cyber security, and to
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the a functioning cyberspace. In theory, anyone with access to a computer, which is most of the
world, has the potential to be a threat to cyber security. Cyber crime is constant and ever present,
particularly in digitalized societies. But in relation to small scale attack, governments can also be
involved in this, as can organized groups, and of course individuals. National cyber security,
which entails the protection of the functioning of all cyberspace,
In addition to not knowing exactly from whom the threats are coming from, it is also difficult to
know what the threat itself is. The pace of innovation in the information age, particularly when it
comes to cyber, evolves at a pace which is difficult to track. Innovation in computer technology
occurs mostly in the private sector. Furthermore, group or individuals can engineer malware
which government have no idea about.
Essentially, a government does not know who will attack where, or with what. What this means
is that for national security, the risk to cyberspace is omnipresent. Every system in the domain is
at risk and threats come from every level. This makes it impossible to define threats to the cyber
domain, and to strategize accordingly. Instead, cyber security must focus on securing or
managing these risks to cyberspace, and think in terms of having a back up plan for every system
to ensure the functioning of cyberspace. Cyber security ranges from securing military and
government systems down to citizens securing online payment info. In a cyber society, security
through management of individual citizens’ cyber activities is vital, since the functioning of
society is dependent on ICT and cyberspace.
I have already touched upon the involvement of individuals in national cyber security in this
section, here I will expand on it. Individuals play a key role in cyber security in several ways,
and can have a profound impact on the cyber domain, one being that individuals can possess the
knowledge and skill sets to be a threat to national cyber security. However, individuals also play
an important part in terms of what needs to be protected (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1171).
When thinking of traditional national security, one which is primarily concerned with territorial
integrity and physical safety of its population, the individual citizen sitting in their own home is
not of direct consequence. However, this is the case with cyber security. The cyber activities of
individuals need to be protected as well as infrastructures and data. This is important for all
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societies, however it is essential for a cyber societies which conducts much of its business
through the web.
This creates an aspect to cyber security which is not prevalent in traditional national security:
that citizens play an active role in it (Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). Cyber security policies and
strategies must pay attention to the role and treatment of individuals (Hansen and Nissenbaum
2009: 1171). Everyday systems and uses bare the brunt of both attacks and importance when it
comes to cyber security. One of the consequences of this is that the population must be well
aware of the risks, as well as have some basic level of knowledge of computer systems in order
to curtail misuse and vulnerabilities. This point is made in the National Cyber Security Strategy
guidelines published by the NATO CCDCOE, which outlines its suggestions and key points a
nation should consider when drafting national cyber security strategies. The NCSS states that it
is necessary for all levels of society to have a basic level of understanding and competence when
it comes to cyber security, and strategy should accommodate this. Strategies ought to have
defined plans for measuring cyber competence amongst a nations population in order to identify
groups which are more at risk of cyber crime, and follow up with plans in order to fill these gaps
in knowledge. In addition to this, states should consider specialized programs for educating
cyber security experts and professionals.
In addition to the involvement of individuals in cyber security, there is also the involvement of
the private sector. The involvement of the private sector in matters of national security is not
new. Private companies have long been granted government contracts in regards to military or
infrastructure projects. However, the level of involvement of the private sector in cyber security
is higher, and it is also necessary. Firstly, private companies, such as banks or health providers,
who utilize digital transactions must be up to date with current technology, be aware of risks, and
have sufficient firewalls and protection. Transactions between individuals and private
companies, private companies and other private companies, and private companies and public
institutions must be secure. This requires a high level of coordination and regulation as well.
This is necessary because most of cyberspace is operated by the private sector (Harknett and
Stever 2009: 2). Therefore a national cyber security strategy must consider how to secure the
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private sectors systems as well, and importantly, and it must also focus on cooperation with the
private sector in management of risks.
Beyond the need for coordination and security in private ICT systems, the private sector is
involved in the general public as well. The number of private e-solutions, e-governance, and ICT
companies has grown exponentially, not only providing solutions to the private sector but also
the public sector. These private companies often have the expertise that governments do not.
Private companies consult on strategy and provide framework or solutions for ICT so that the
intersection between public and private sector in cyberspace is difficult to separate, if at all
(Harknett and Stever 2009: 10). The NCSS guidelines suggest this as well, particularly that the
private sector should be involved in the decision-making process when developing strategy and
solutions in order to get all relevant experience possible. In actuality, the involvement of the
private sector in the way and beyond seems unavoidable when drafting strategy and when
implementing it. This inclusion of the whole of society is dubbed the ‘Cybersecurity Triad’ by
Harknett and Stever, with the three parts being the government, the private sector, and the
‘cybercitizen’ (11). They state that the ‘triad’ is necessary in order to create a resilient cyber
security, elsewise important areas which are not treated in traditional security notions could be
ignored (5).
As cyberspace extends into other sectors of society, cyber security also extends into other
domains of security (Harknett and Stever 2009: 8; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1157). Cyber
security has a direct impact on anything that is influenced or maintained by ICT, which includes
but is not at all limited to infrastructure such as energy systems and military and defense
systems. In all societies national security is tied to cyber security, and in a cyber society, national
security is dependent on it (Harknett and Stever 2009: 3). As it is important to include the private
sector in strategy, it is also important to include stakeholders from other security sectors, such as
military or energy (NCSS). Cyber security includes the security of all of cyberspace, which
extends to other sectors. In fact, all political and military affairs now contain some level of cyber
dimension (Geers 2009: 2). This means that cyber security is also borderless in terms of sector.

21
Physical size and population does not have a direct effect on cyber security (some may say
negative: small states may have an easier time regularizing cyber systems and securing
cyberspace than a larger country with many systems and players. It is easier to innovate in a
small state). Traditionally, larger and more populous states are more powerful due to having
more resources, and larger territories are more difficult to conquer. Such has always been the
case. However, in cyberspace the size of territory does not determine the cyber capabilities of a
state, nor does the population. A small country may be weak militarily, but be more advanced in
terms of cyber capabilities than its much larger neighbor, and therefore carry more weight
internationally in regards to cyber issues. Furthermore, because physical distance has a deflated
significance in cyberspace, states have a global reach and platform much easier (Areng 2014: 5).
The cyber domain is separated by its borderless nature. It lacks clear boundaries in many
respects: boundaries in terms of threats, actors, levels, and physical borders. This makes the
concept of comprehensive security a reality, cyber security is truly comprehensive security
which an entire society much participate in to achieve. While other forms of security may share
similarities, none can be wholly describe as borderless as cyber security it. The domain in which
cyber security operates, cyberspace, is lacking in physical boundaries yet it bares many
characteristics of a physical security domain. It can be treated a vital, and perhaps most
important, part of national security while also having the need for new concepts of national
security and new ways of approaching policy and strategy making.
1.3 Cyber Opportunity
Another things that sets the cyber domain apart from other types of domains of security, and
therefore the treatment of cyber security by states, is its reflexive nature. Rather than threats
being generated from outside of the border, threats are generated from a states innovation. The
threats that we face in cyberspace, whether it be cybercrime, threats to national cyber
infrastructure, or cyber attacks, only exist because we have created cyberspace in the first place
(Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013: 100). The level of cyber risk is dependent on how advanced
a societies digital space it, the more advance it is the more they are at risk (Hansen and
Nissenbaum 2009: 1155). This is especially the case when it comes to cyber societies, who
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depend on ICT for the functioning of the state. These states face more risk in terms of cyber
security than a state which is less developed in terms of digitalization. The cyber capabilities of
others is significant as well, a individual, group, or nation is a risk only when they too possess
equal or better capabilities. However, the capabilities of others is inconsequential if a state
doesn’t have a developed digital infrastructure. Today, every nation has some level of
digitalization therefore every state is at least somewhat at risk. The unique aspect is that more
advanced societies are more at risk than less advanced societies. This is the case in regards to
both risks from other actors (cybercrime, cyber attacks, etc), but also basic malfunctions and
failures that pose a risk.
This is not the case in regards to traditional domains of security, and national security strategies.
Usually when we think of national security, what is already there dictates much of how strategy
is formed. Who your neighbors are, what current political climates are like, all contribute to
strategy. This goes for cyber security as well, but what exists already is less important. The cyber
capabilities of a neighboring state, or a hostile group or individual, is less of threat if you do not
depend on ICT that much. Also, if your digital infrastructure is not advanced or cutting edge, you
may not be susceptible to new technologies problems that might effect countries whose
infrastructure is. On the other hand, a nation without nuclear capabilities can still be attacked
with them.
Much of the risk towards cyberspace does not stem from potential cyber attacks, but from normal
system failures where there is no perpetrator or attacker (O’Connell 2012: 191). The risk is
created through the digitalization itself. When a new technology is introduced, new ways in
which it can fail follow suit. Computer viruses would not exist without computers. So even
though advances in cyberspace and digital systems brings a wealth of societal benefits, it also
brings many risks and challenges that are new for society. The risk of someone across the world
gaining access to your personal information is a risk that is only possible because of the advances
in the cyberspace. The internet allows us to communicate more efficiently, but it also aids in the
spread of misinformation. Every innovation in cyber technology brings both positive effects as
well as negative effects, which we as a society do not also know or account for. Policy makers
are aware of this characteristic, and acknowledge it in strategies and in their understanding of
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cyber security. The NCSS guidelines highlights this, stressing that nations should be aware of
this characteristic when drafting strategy (NCSS 10).
1.4 Cyber Deterrence
Deterrence is an important topic when it come to national security. Deterrence is the concept of
stopping an attack before it even begins and is often a key part of security strategy. This usually
includes the building up of capabilities and pursuing one or both of the following concepts:
deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial seeks to build up a
nation’s capabilities so that potential adversaries doubt that they can cause harm, while
deterrence by punishment seeks to stop attackers based on fear of retribution (O’Connell 2012:
187). This concept is mostly obvious in regards to traditional and military national security,
particularly in discussion and strategies regarding nuclear weapons. In relation to cyber security,
deterrence by denial would consist of building up a nations cyber defense system to the point
where attackers would not try. With deterrence by punishment, this might include a system of
cyber offensive abilities and somehow showcasing these abilities.
However, cyber deterrence by these terms is muddled. Firstly, deterrence strategy is usually
geared towards military attacks, where the actors are mostly states and the attacks are physical.
Deterrence in these circumstances includes building up militaries and defensive systems, and
vocalizing one’s willingness and ability to retaliate. Cyber attacks may have physical
consequences, but for the most part it is systems and digital infrastructure in cyberspace that is at
jeopardy. Additionally, as stated before, potential cyber attacks are brought on by actors other
than the state very often. An individual or a group is less likely to be put off by a governments
heavy duty firewall system than a state. Also, because it is very difficult to track perpetrators of
cyber attacks, deterrence by punishment is more difficult as well. If any actor, state, group, or
individual, understand that there is a small chance that a state will be able to prove that they are
responsible, then they will not fear retribution and deterrence by punishment will be
unsuccessful.
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Finally, deterrence strategy is all about deterring potential attackers. However, the biggest risk to
cyberspace is not outside aggressors, but system failures that occur at the fault of no one. Unlike
traditional security domains, risk is manufactured by the state itself, and the threats that the cyber
domain faces does not actually have an actor to deter. In this case deterrence strategy is
completely useless. This means that while deterrence may be a part of a cyber security strategy,
it won’t be of vital importance, since cyber attacks are not the only focus of cyber security. This
in itself calls for a rethinking of national security strategy in relation to the cyber domain. States
cannot simply apply similar strategy frameworks to the cyber domain and adapt deterrence
strategy. Doing so would result in an anemic strategy which would poorly prepare a country in
terms of cyber security, and would not encompass the nature of cyberspace (Barajevá 2017: 15).
That being said, deterrence is still at play in cyber security, but in a different way. The
establishment of the NATO CCDCOE in 2004, which was founded on the idea of cooperative
defense between NATO countries can be viewed as a method of deterrence. The centre focuses
on training, research, and developing in order to bolster the cyber defense methods of allies. (In
the CCDCOE’s NCSS guidelines, there is very little mentioned about deterrence in strategy).
Cyber security is a relatively new phenomenon, which means that experts and academic are
trying to fully understand how it works and how to achieve it (Goodman 2010: 106). Cyber
defense is still an important aspect of cyber security, which includes setting up barriers against
potential attackers, but it is an ongoing learning process for policy makers.
1.5 Proactive Versus Reactive Policies
The features of the cyber domain change the way that nations must consider cyber security
strategy and policy. Often national security strategies are grounded in past experiences and
potential threats that are perceived by the nation. In this way strategy and policy are reactive in
nature, as policy makers are reacting to past events and basing future actions on experience and
history. However, cyber security strategy is not reactive, but proactive. Strategies and policies
seek to lay out a spectrum of preventative measures in order to deal with a myriad of potential
attacks and failures in cyberspace (Geers 2009: 7; Tikk 2011: 2). They choose to focus on things
that might happen rather than things that have happened. One reason for this is because
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cyberspace is a relatively new domain of interest in terms of national security, so there is a lot of
history to shape strategy and policy.
This is not to say that all actions taken in the name of cyber security are proactive in nature. The
famous cyber attacks that occurred in Estonia in 2007 prompted many nations to consider cyber
security more seriously, so technically states are reacting to past events (Czosseck et al 2011).
However, cyber strategy is not based off of a single event. National cyber strategies are not
singularly crafted to respond to the famous cyber attacks, but rather to be ready to deal with
anything. The attack showed the world that you do not know when an attack is going to happen
and must be prepared at all times.
The proactive nature of cyber security strategy is also seen in strategy and policy not geared
towards attacks, but towards reflexive cyber opportunity. As illustrated above, cyber security is
not solely or even mostly about securing cyberspace from attackers, but from system failures and
malfunctions. There is also a lack of experience in this for most governments. There has not been
a massive ICT failure upon which strategy making could react too. Even ignoring this, however,
the nature of cyberspace in that with every new innovation comes new problems, it would be
unwise to focus on past events to shape current strategy. Instead, cyber security strategy must
focus on countering the issues and potential problems that come with new innovation, and how
to handle the unexpected.
The proactive stance towards policy and strategy is realized through the idea of cyber resilience.
Cyber resilience stresses the importance of having a systems which can withstand attacks and
malfunctions without widespread difficulties. This usually includes back up systems and
alternative solutions, so that if a system goes down or something is compromised, then there is
another system waiting to pick up (Geers 2009: 7; Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). The NCSS
guidelines also stress the importance of cyber resilience in national cyber security strategy,
stating that implementing the idea of resilience includes being aware of the risks of malfunctions
and the level of dependence on ICT so that these problems can be addressed. Another way in
which strategy takes a proactive stance is by practicing “good cyber hygiene”, which includes
informing the population on safe internet practices. (O’Connell 2012: 206). Finally, most nations
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employ a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which is tasked with dealing with
emergencies related to ICT and cyberspace. These teams respond incidents of all natures, both in
case of cyber attacks, malfunctions, or system failures. The point of these teams is to be prepared
for any sort of emergency occurring in the nations cyberspace.
Another way in which proactive nature of cyber security strategy can be seen through the idea of
prevention. This includes the concept of deterrence, but also can be seen in the goal of cyber
hygiene amongst the population. The concept of awareness amongst the civilian population is an
important one all throughout cyber security strategy, but it has a role to play in regards to
prevention (Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). Firstly, correct usage of ICT leads to more efficient
usage and reduces the risk of user-based issues. Secondly, awareness of the potential risks by the
population, such as awareness to keep passcodes private and to be wary of phishing, decreases
the instances of cybercrime.
Proactive cyber security strategy and policy encompass the characteristics of the cyber domain.
Cyberspace is a domain which is characteristic by inherent and systemic risk, which in turn
forces policy-makers to draft cyber security strategy to look forward and be prepared for
anything, particularly because of how much can go wrong on many different levels. This is
distinct from other security domains, specifically traditional national security, which are more
focused and had defined threats that are addressed. The cyber domain as a security domain in
unique in that the threat is constant and unknown, the actors are often untraceable, and risk is
generated from cyberspace itself. This creates a concept of cyber security which must focus on
the management of these risks through resilience of their systems and awareness of the
populations.
1. 6 Conclusion
The cyber domain lacks the clear boundaries and characteristics which changes the concept of
cyber security, steering it away from traditional notions of security. The cyber domain is
inherently borderless in nature, lacking first and foremost physical boundaries and being
impossible to clear set national borders. The strategizing and implementation of security is no
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longer contained at the state level in the cyber domain, but must include the whole of society,
and thus it lacks borders in that respect as well. There is also a lack of defined threats to the
cyber domain, and it is instead characterized by constant risk, known and unknown, borne from
cyberspace itself. The innovation and advances that a society makes in cyberspace also threatens
the security of that same space, creating a never ending cycle of risk. These characteristics all
culminate in a proactive approach to cyber security strategy and policy, which emphasizes
resilience and preparedness, rather than addressing specific threats.
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING CYBER SECURITY THROUGH RISK SOCIETY
I have argued that cyber security cannot be efficiently understood through traditional theories of
security. In this section I discuss Ulrich Beck’s social theory of risk society, and argue that the
key concepts in this theory can equip up to best understand the nature of the cyber domain and
cyber security. I start off with a brief introduction to risk society, including defining key terms
and concepts within the theory, including reflexive modernity, presence of the future, and the
role of the private sector. I then directly apply this to the characteristics of cyber security as
described above, and argue that Beck’s theory on risk society is the most appropriate theory to
analyze cyber security.
2.1 Risk Society
Risk Society and Reflexive Modernity
Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk society came into the spotlight in the 1990’s as a sociological theory
on modernization and risk. Beck theorized that society was moving into a ‘new modernity’, or
second modernity as it has sometimes been called, which was distinct from what we understand
as simply ‘modernity’. New modernity was one in which society was governed by systemic risks
and modern institutions, and one which is less defined by borders and boundaries (Beck, Bonss,
Lau 2003: 4). A risk society is aware of these characteristics, most importantly the risks which
govern it.
Many different definitions of varying complexity and significance have been put forward
recently due to popularity on the concept of ‘risk’ and security. However, the one employed by
Beck, and also by this paper, is not overly complex. Risk can be defined as “hazards and
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck 1992: 21). There is no need
to overly theorize the concept of risk, but there is a need to differentiate from risk from threat.
Whereas a risk has the potential to cause harm, a threat has both the potential and intent. While
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traditional security communities focuses on specific threats, a risk society focuses on risk, i.e.
what could happen, and how to manage the multitude of risks that arise in a modern society.
Therefore, a risk society is one which has become aware and apprehensive about of the existence
of these dangers – not just a society in which these dangers are present (Beck 2003: 21).
Humans have always been at risk, but what sets this type of risk apart is the origin of risk. Risks
such as natural disasters or diseases have always loomed over humanity. However, neither of
these risks have been created by society. Now, industrialization has created potentially grave
environmental risks, medical advances such as antibiotics have created antibiotic-resistant strains
of diseases. These risks have been manufactured by humans; they simple would not exist without
human society. This is what is meant by ‘systemic risks’; they are risks that are generated from
the modern institutions that we as a society have created.
Another defining characteristic of this type of risk is its inherently global nature, which
particularly applies to security and challenges conventional notions (beck 1992: 34). Risks
manufactured in the new modern times does not have boundaries, they are global in nature.
Conventional security often thinks in terms of the security dilemma, where one state’s security
means another’s insecurity, however this concept is not present in security thought within a risk
society. National security can never be completely disentangled from the security of other states.
And while state’s cannot think in terms of ‘security for the human race’, security from
manufacture threats such as pollution and totally drug-resistant tuberculosis benefits all nations.
The concept that risk within a risk society is propagated by the society’s modernization is called
reflexive modernity. As we as a society continue to modernize and advance, we inherently create
new risks that we can not predict (Beck, Lau, Bons 2003: 17). This has always been the case, as
society’s actions have always had consequences. The differentiating factor is that we are now
aware of this fact. The difference between pre-modern times and the new modernity is this
awareness. For example, industrialization has created numerous risks that we must deal with in
current time. However, when initially industrializing, society was not aware of the potential risks
it would create, nor that modernization itself inherently created risk. In a risk society, we are
aware of the fact that industrialization cause risks: both that it harms human health and had
potentially irreversible side effect to the environment and that there is a multitude of risk that
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may accompany it that we cannot foresee. This awareness is what creates a risk society.
Awareness of reflexive modernity and the risk that accompanies it is operationalize in a society
through its decision making process and its strategies and policies (Elbe 2008: 10). Being aware
of a vast array of risks brought on by modernization, emphasis is placed on preparedness and
management of those risks (Krahmann 2010: 349). Policies and strategies become less focused
on specific threats and focus on potential risks. In security strategy and policy specifically, this
means that strategies and policies become more proactive in nature rather than reactive. When
employing traditional understanding of security, policy is more reactive in nature, responding to
threats. In this case, strategy and policy is often shaped by past events. A previous invasion or
hostility with a certain state can come to influence policy direction greatly. In a risk society,
however, there is less focus on what has happened in the past and more focus on what could
happen in the future, which creates a presence of the future which can be detected in the policies
and strategies of a risk society. Risk societies are governed by the future, not the past. The
emphasis become risk management and planning for future risks as opposed to addressing
specific threat.

The Role of the Private Sector in a Risk Society
The role of the private sector within a risk society, particularly related to risk management, is
unique and departs from the traditional role. The pervasiveness of risk management in a risk
society creates a important role for private solutions companies, one which they happily fill as
well as exacerbate. With an emphasis on risk management, the key is the word management.
While the private sector sells solutions, they are involved in the management not solving of risks,
which continued to create business for the private sector. In essence, Beck states that “risks are
no longer the dark side of opportunities, they are also market opportunities” (Beck 92: 46).
More than being heavily involved in risk management, the private sector actually propagates risk
society. The first way in which is does this is through reflexive modernity, just like all other
modernization (Krahmann 2010: 352). The growing capitalist market creates risks, both known
and unknown, which can be applied to all areas in modern society. However, this difference in
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the private sector is that it is knowingly and purposefully contributing to these risks by
proliferating, and perhaps exaggerating, the risks brought on by modernization. If the market
thrives on risk, the more risk the better. This creates a ‘culture of fear’, which in turn makes
more business for private companies and expands their roles within the sector (Krahmann 20120:
358; Aradau 2008: 151).
In traditional ideas of security, particularly in the military sector, there is often involvement of
private companies. However, this cooperation is often contractual and formal. In a risk society,
the involvement of private security companies is less formal and more incorporated. Part of this
is to do with the fact that the growing market for risk solutions from private sector to public
sector, so that the private sector tends to amass a substantial number of experts. A common trend
is that more experienced and qualified security experts cross over to private sector after years in
the public sector. As a result, the public sector seeks out the expertise of the private sector, which
has varied knowledge of experts.
The demand for private solutions is encouraged by the unknown nature of risks within a risk
society. While the public sector may be more than capable of identifying and planning for risks
that they foresee, a second opinion is always beneficial. The more potential risks that are
identified and managed, the better. This creates an opportunity for the private sector to identify
risks (Krahmann 2010: 366).

2.2 Understanding the Borderless Nature of Cyber Security
I have argued at length that the borderless nature of the cyber domain it one of its defining
features. This includes the lack of physical boundaries, the lack of sectoral boundaries, and lack
of defined threats and risks. Such is the case within a risk society. A risk society is characterized
by the blending of traditional borders, which is what occurs in cyber security (Beck 1992: 101).
Cyberspace is has no true borders. While it is true that nations do draw lines and attempt to
define what ‘national cyberspace’ is, this is on more of a surface level and cannot ever truly be
achieved. Cyber security is a man-made domain which is not entirely physical, and does not
obey national borders. This includes the question of where does cyber security end? Securing
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cyberspace effect an entire society, from banking to military to energy. Nor does it effect these
things indirectly, but rather directly. Cyber security must encompass all of these things, and the
more digitalized a society is, the more interconnected it becomes. So as the need for cyberspace
grows, and states develop cyber security, the boundaries become less and less defined.
Likewise, the blurring of traditional boundaries applies to the lack of specific threats and actors
within cyber security, specifically in terms of actors. As discussed previously, a striking
difference in the cyber domain as a security domain is that everyone has the potential to be a
threat, and therefore everyone is a risk (Hansen and Nissembaum 2009: 1171). This includes
both individuals inside and outside of national borders. This is a significant departure from
traditional notions on threat. In the cyber domain there are no definite boundaries on who or
what is a threat or not, and this has significant implications on the way cyber security strategy is
both understood and the way it is handled. Analyzing the characteristics of the cyber domain and
the implications they have on the way cyber security through a lens of risk society helps us to
understand why strategy has become more proactive, risk-focused, and included more
stakeholder in the process.
Lastly, the close collaboration between the private and public sector in regards to cyber security
is something that we do not see in traditional security sector. Yes, there have always been
military contracts between the private sector and the public sector, but this level of involvement
is beyond that. We can not explain the role of the private sector, which is not just important but
necessary, through traditional security theory. However if we look at it from a risk society point
of view, we can see that this level of involvement is to be expected in a domain such as the
cyber, which is characterized by the blurring of traditional borders.
Cyber security is approached in a holistic manner, in which both the public, private and civilian
sectors are considered and included. I have expounded on the significance of the private sector
both in cyber security, and its significance within risk society theory. The private sector is
involved in the strategy and policy making process, and it considered a vital part. The private
sector has huge significance in terms of the implementation of strategy and policy, since much,
and in many cases most, of cyberspace is operated by private companies. Therefore the
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significance of including the private sector in the process and implementation is of utmost
importance. The importance of considering the civilian population cannot be understated. Every
individual behind a computer is a risk, but they are also an important part of securing cyberspace
and perhaps the biggest tool. Cyber awareness and cyber hygiene focus on educating the
population of a country so that they may decrease the risk associated with common usage and
protect themselves and others. The key element here is that individual are directly involved in
maintaining (and threatening) cyber security. Every last individual must be included and
considered in the process and implementation of cyber security, from strategy and policy to
implementation.
2.3 Cyber Opportunity as Reflexive Modernity
Beck’s definition of risk fits the characterization that is dealt with in cyber security. The ‘risk’ in
a ‘risk society’ is one which is generated by the system itself, the very system that it threatens
(Elbe 2008: 8; Beck 1992: 21; 2003). This is exactly the case within cyberspace. This risk that
cyber security faces and must address comes from the advancement of cyber technology and
would not exist without it. While it seems obvious that malware and cyber attacks would not
exist without the existence of cyberspace, we must remember that this is not the case with other
domains of security. A nation’s territory is threatened by its neighbors’ military aggressive
regardless of it’s own military advancements. Systemic risk is what plagues cyber security for
both nations and global cyberspace. The risk of both cyber attacks and cyber malfunctions and
malware are both systemic. This also correlates to the fact that cyber societies are more
vulnerable than those which are less dependent on ICT, against stressing the idea that cyber
opportunity is reflexive (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 19). Digitalization brings about many
benefits and connects us globally, however there is a risk associated with each benefit, both
known and unknown. In addition to the self-generated risk which characterizes cyber security, it
is also often does not have a specific aggressor, but rather risk that features common
malfunctions (ibid 24). Traditional security studies cannot be used to adequately understand and
analyze cyber security, as it does not account for the origin of these risks and the effects they
have on strategy and policy.
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2.4 Private Sector in Cyber Security
The theorization of the role of the private sector in a risk society also aligns with that of cyber
security. Because of the emphasis on risk management in particular, the involvement of the
private sector is ongoing and never ending (Krahmann 2010: 352). In a risk society the inclusion
of the private sector is much more informal and incorporated, which can be seen in cyber
security. As I have discussed, the involvement of the private sector is of monumental
importance. This is due to the borderless nature described above, but also because of the
expertise that private companies bring to the strategy table. If the private sector is the origin of
much of the cyber innovation in a society, than they are also the origin of innovation in terms of
solutions and protecting cyberspace (ibid 365). In a risk society the private sector both creates
and manages the systemic risk. This is what we observe in cyber security. The private sector
advances cyber technology, therefore creating more risk, then becomes involved in the process
of managing that risk. The private sector is involved in strategy and policy making, but also
involved in consulting in technical terms and providing technical risk management.

2.5 Presence of the Future and Cyber Security Strategy
The borderless and reflexive nature of cyber security culminates in proactive strategy and policy
which focuses on resilience. Another way of describing this quality is by stating there is a
presence of the future in cyber security strategy and policy. In my discussion on the nature of
cyber security strategy in chapter 1, I stated that rather than being reactive in nature, cyber
security strategy is proactive, meaning that it is forward looking and seeks to address the
unknown risks which plague cyberspace (Beck, Bonss, Lau 2008: 9). In this way, cyber security
mirrors risk society and shows that that there is the presence of the future in strategies and
policies, meaning that the future and what could happen, shapes and guides strategy (Harkett and
Stever 2009: 2). This is in contrast to reactive policies, which are guided by past events and have
a presence of the past. This is necessary in cyber security strategy due to its reflexive nature.
Because of the systemic risks which are created by digitalization, it is impossible to make a
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strategy which solely responds to specific threats. Instead, strategy must be ready for anything
that the future might bring, and most importantly, be ready for action when things fail. This is
where cyber resilience comes in; ICT must be agile and able to withstand constant attacks and
malfunction of all nature, and when a system fails, there must be a back up in order to ensure
society’s functioning. However, this is not to say that cyber security strategy is exclusively
forward look, but is rather both forward looking and conscious of past events.
This presence of the future which is seen in proactive approaches to cyber security is influenced
by both the borderless nature and the reflexive opportunity observed in cyberspace. Cyber
security strategy must be governed by the future, because of its reflexive nature. There is not
going back in terms of digitalization, only forwards, which means that both innovation and risk
will continue to grow. Cyber security must be prepared for these systemic risks which are borne
out of advances in cyber technology. This is stressed in strategic documents, specific in the
NCSS guidelines. Safeguarding cyberspace from the vast myriad of risks is of utmost
importance. Additionally, the need for preparedness is seen in the establishment of CERTs,
which is an essential part of any nations cyber security strategy.
Lastly, we arrive to perhaps one of the most important points and strongest examples for why the
cyber domain and why cyber security is better understood through a lens of risk society, which is
the fact that society is aware of these characteristics. Because there is a clear presence of the
future in the conception of cyber security, this means that strategy and policy makers are aware
of the reflexive nature of cyberspace, and aware that they must be ready for new risks and threats
which emerge from it (Beck, Bonss, Lau 2008: 18). The emphasis on risk management is an
example of this awareness. Policy makers are aware the risk to cyberspace cannot be eliminated
because it is self-generated and never ending (Harknett and Stever 2009: 29). The risk can only
be managed and planned for, but not stopped. This awareness is reflected in all society, from the
private sector to the civilian population, who are included in the maintenance and upkeep of a
states cyber security. This awareness is what defines a risk society and characterizes the nature of
strategy and policy with the society.
2. 6 Conclusion
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Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk society is the most appropriate theory to explain the nature and
functioning of cyber security, and the strategy and policy which emerges. The borderless nature
of cyber security, including the lack of defined threat or actor, the total involvement of a society
in the security process, and the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity are all characteristics which
are descriptive of a risk society. The discourse which surrounds cyber security shows the
awareness of these attributes, exemplifying the fact that society is aware of the risk which
characterizes cyberspace. State’s understanding and the nature of strategy and policy show that
cyber security is best understood when observed from a lens of risk society.
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CHAPTER 3: ESTONIAN CYBER SECURITY
In this chapter I will present my research findings. I begin with a discussion on the methodology
of my research and my reasoning for choosing to gather data through interviews. I also provide a
detailed explanation of my interviewing process, including my criteria for interviewees,
interview structure, and method of analysis. I then discuss my findings at length and argue that
Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders conceptualize the cyber domain differently to
conventional security domains, and that this has a profound impact on the way that they
understand risk and security within cyber. These understanding reflect in the handling and
planning of cyber security strategy. This departure is best understood through analysis using a
risk society framework.

3.1 Methodology and Analysis
This dissertation is a case study on Estonian cyber security, focusing on the understanding of
Estonian cyber security policy stakeholders regarding cyber security. The basis of risk society
stems from the understanding and perception of the society itself. Rather than a threat-based,
reactive concept of security strategy and policy, a risk society in one which is preoccupied with
the future, and is aware of the risks that are created by its continued modernization. The purpose
of this research paper is to study the understanding of security and risk by Estonian policymakers and stakeholders, and how this understanding has departed from traditional notions. I
argue that the understanding and treatment of cyber security is fundamentally different, and these
differences are best understood through a lens of risk society theory.
In this section I follow a similar structure that I have in chapters 1 and 2. I trace the
characteristics of the cyber domain and their effects on cyber security strategy, analyzing the
discourse of Estonian policy-makers through this lens. Firstly, Estonian policy-makers and
stakeholders ar aware that of the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity, meaning that they are
aware that as Estonian continues to digitize, this will continue to create risks, both known and
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unknown. This awareness would not be as readily shown in formal documents or papers as it
would in discussing cyber security with individual policy makers.
Secondly, the understanding is translated into policy and strategy. Strategy and policy is focused
on concepts such as alternate solutions, cyber resilience, and general adaptability of the cyber
security structure of Estonia. These policy characteristics are identifiable in cyber documents,
however its is the process of understanding and its translation which must be traced.
Thirdly, an understanding of the lack of traditional borders of cyber security is apparent. This is
something that is best to be discussed and understood through interviews, as it is not always
possible to detect in policy and strategy. A emphasis on the importance of the involvement of the
whole of society, or mention of need to keep citizens up to date and aware of the evolving
technologies and risks, may not be present in cyber security strategy. Also, an emphasis on the
importance of promoting e-solutions and ICT in both the European and international community
may not be apparent. And the implication of the importance of promoting Estonia’s own cyber
structure and e-solutions, as well as Estonian companies, may be visible in strategy.
In order to support my argument that Estonian understanding of security pertaining to the cyber
domain has changed, and is best understood through a lens of risk society theory, I conducted
interviews. My goal was to capture to understanding of Estonian policy-makers and stakeholder
regarding the nature of the cyber domain and the formation of strategy. I interviewed experts
have contributed, influenced, and built the cyber security strategy and structure of Estonia. The
reason I chose to collect data via interviews is due to the fact that it was the best way to get a
firm grasp on the understanding behind policy and strategy. Simply examining policy and
strategy would be inadequate in grasping the concept of security behind it, particularly the
involvement of other sectors and of other parts of society.
My interviewees are from a wide range of Estonian institutions and sectors, including public,
intergovernmental, and academic. In the public sector, interviewees are experts who have
consulted, studied and drafted cyber security documents, manuals and strategies in Estonia. I had
several different ways in which I found and decided upon my interviewees. The first step was to
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contact individuals who held positions regarding cyber security at government ministries and
research institutions and contact them via emails. This was mostly successful. The second way in
which I chose interviewees was through examination of strategy and other important documents
pertaining to cyber security and noting reoccurring names of experts who had done substantial
drafting of strategy or research on cyber security. The final way in which I got into contact was
from the recommendation of those who I had already interviewed.
Interviews are semi-structured, with 6 questions being prepared before hand on average, and
lasting 30 – 45 minutes. The majority of interviews were conducting in person at the
interviewees place of work, with (one) being conducted over Skype. Questions run along the
lines of asking the interviewees perceptions of cyber security and it’s key features, the nature of
cyber policies and strategy, and the actors in cyber security. The core questions are as follows:
1) Is cyber security different to other areas of security?
a. How does this translate to strategy and policy?
2) Are cyber security strategies and policies more focused on addressing specific threats or
being prepared?
3) Who is involved in the strategy making process?
a. How is the private sector/other government sectors involved?
4) How engaged is the general population in the maintenance of cyber security?
5) What do you think the biggest risk to Estonian cyber security is?
6) Is Estonia unique in the way that it handles cyber security?
Sub-questions are only asked if they follow a logical path. Likewise, questions are tailored to
individual interviewees expertise, and whether expertise is rooted in technical, legal or policy
experience.
The overall purpose of questions is to gage the understanding of cyber security of the
interviewees in what is essential a binary test: do policy makers understand cyber security as
being primarily concerned with the future, or the past? Data collected is analyzed using discourse
analysis. If a interviewees answers focus on proactive policies that must be prepared for
unprecedented risk that do not stem from perceived threats, but rather form the nature of

40
cyberspace itself, this signals a presence of the future which is a defining feature of a risk
society. This is mostly addressed through questions 2 and 5. Carefully attention has been paid to
the description of the risks and actors involved in cyber security, along with the most important
features of strategy and policy.
Another goal of the questions is to get a firm grasp on the interviewees understanding of the
borderless nature of cyber security, or the blurring of traditional boundaries which is seen in risk
society. Questions 3 and 4 and mainly geared towards this, and question 5 to a lesser degree. I
focus specifically on the involvement of other sectors, besides government, in order to detail the
importance of cooperation and horizontal collaboration in regards to drafting and implementing
cyber security strategy. I also placed an emphasis on the understand of risk and perceptions of
threat in order to showcase the proactive nature of strategy and the presence of the future.
It is important to note the ways in which I have avoided bias and influencing the data collected in
interviews. First and foremost I avoided using words which might influence or steer interviewees
answers unnaturally; mostly words which I considered ‘buzzwords’ in my research. These are
terms which have been discussed mostly in chapter one of the dissertation, and I therefore
avoided my own understand of cyber security steering data. The avoided words were
‘borderless’, ‘risk management’, ‘reflexive’, and ‘resilience’. Instead, I waited for interviewees
to use these terms themselves and then asked them to elaborate. I also avoided using terms found
in Beck’s risk society theory, such as ‘risk society’ and ‘presence of the future’, and overall
avoided any theoretical questions. These measures were taken in order to ensure the integrity of
my data and get a grasp on interviewees own experiences and views.
3.2 Research Findings & Analysis
This section will present the findings of my research and analyze them. This will include a
analysis of discourse concerning the nature of the cyber domain and the management of risk in
Estonian cyber security strategy. This analysis will mirror my the argument I have presented in
this paper already, supporting the argument that viewing the understanding and treatment of the
cyber by policy-makers is best analyzed through a risk society framework. I will present direct
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quotes from my interviewees and discuss these statements and how they exemplify a departure
form traditional understanding of security.
Classifying Estonia as a Cyber Society
I have argued that Estonia is a ideal case study for studying cyber security due to its high level of
digitalization and focus on the cyber domain. I have introduced the concept of cyber society, a
society which is dependent on ICT, and presented Estonia as an example of cyber society.
Estonian society is extremely dependent on digital services, relying on ICT for everything from
taxes to banking to government records. This dependence is realized by cyber security experts as
well; all interviewees stressed how important ICT is for Estonian society. Dr. Rain Ottis, from
Tallinn Technical University, stressed this early on in his discussing of Estonian cyber security:
“Estonia is still very dependent [on ICT] and cyber security is still very
important…Cyber security in Estonia is not a nice to have thing, it is a must have thing
and therefore we should put emphasis and effort there.”
Here Dr. Ottis states that cyber security is an essential part of the functioning of Estonian society,
not merely something that is ‘nice to have’. This puts the importance of cyber security for
Estonia into perspective. Other experts also talked about Estonian dependency on ICT:
“The dependency on IT grows and it grows fast.”
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA
“We are very dependent on the e-services, and there is no going back to paper.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
Clearly there is an awareness of the extent of dependence on ICT and the significance this puts
on cyber security. The fact that Estonia is a cyber society is significant, as is the awareness of
this fact by policy makers, which will be discussed later in this chapter. This further stresses my
point that Estonia is a crucial case study because of its dependence on ICT. Throughout my
interviews, it was extremely clear that Estonia is a cyber society and is dependent on e-services.
This is supported by the nature of the Estonia ID-card system, which requires all citizens to have
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the electronic card with which all government services, and the overwhelming majority of
private services, reply upon. Nearly all government business is handled through e-services, and
99.6% of all banking in Estonia is done through the web (e-stonia facts). Dr. Ottis’ statement
reiterates the point I have made earlier in this paper: with increasing dependence on ICT comes
an increasing importance of cyber security.
Borderless Nature of the Cyber Domain
I argue in chapter 1 that one of the most defining features of the cyber domain is its borderless
nature. In risk society this is described as the blurring of traditional boundaries that is inherent in
new modernity. This section discusses the qualification of the cyber domain as borderless by
policy-makers and stakeholders in Estonian cyber security, focusing on their description of the
nature and conception of what sets the cyber domain and cyber security apart.
One of the most important parts of determining how experts understand cyber security as a
whole, what defines it, and how it is different. When answering this question, experts almost
always started off their discussion by stating the borderless nature of the cyber domain or cyber
security. Some directly compared this to the nature of conventional security, stressing that this
was a quality that was extremely important and determined how policy makers handle cyber
security. Pilleriin Lillemets, a researcher at the Baltic Defence College (BDC), said:
“One defining part of cyber security is the borderless nature of it; it makes it more
complicated. You cant only have your very national policy or strategy because you are
very much connect with every part of the world.”
An expert at the Ministry of Economy and Communication, which is the ministry in charge of
drafting Estonia’s national cyber security strategy, began discussion by saying:
“The thing is that cyber security doesn’t have any borders; …when you talk about cyber
security, it is international, cross border and effects every person. In short I think cyber is
quite wide, you cannot put it in certain boundaries, its impossible.”
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Mr. Siim Alatalu, of the CCDCOE, also spoke about the difference of the cyber domain
compared to others, specifically stating that the fact that it was man-made set it apart. So cyber
security is set apart by its borderless nature, which is something that must be considered when
talking about it. For several of the interviewees, this was the first thing that was explicitly
mentioned when asked to described cyber security and how it is different. From the above
statements alone we can see a clear understanding of the borderless nature of the cyber domain,
and we will see how it effect the nature of cyber security strategy. Not only did experts simply
qualify it as borderless, but many went on to describe the specific qualities which lack
boundaries that had been also described in chapters 1 and 2. The following subsections take a
closer look into what specific aspects of cyber security were lacking in borders.
Lack of Defined Threat
It is impossible to make a inclusive list of all of the risks and threats to the cyber domain.
Estonian policy makers are aware of this and highlight the fact that much of the risk and threat
are unknown and impossible to track, and that it is futile to attempt to focus on specific threats.
This is something that guides strategy and policy.
The interviewee at the Cyber Defence College elaborated on the idea of threat, focusing on the
unknown features of it:
“I think what makes it different the unknown part of it.”
Taimar Peterkop, the head of the RIA, specifically contrasted the nature of threat in cyber
security to that of traditional military security:
“If you look at military security, for centuries the threat has been to the east and they’ve
used the same routes, so its always the same approach […] so you know what to do. But
in cyber it changes, but every year you have a completely new threat.”
Mr. Peterkop also detailed the specific routes that had been utilized in military attacks against
Estonia for centuries. This highlights a very important point: in military security for Estonia,
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threats are tied to physical borders and therefore easy to understand and know, and they are often
constant. The tools may change but the routes do not. But because cyberspace is constantly
expanding and innovating, the tools and the routes change. This makes it very difficult to zero in
on specific threats and make precise strategies on past knowledge, as it is with conventional
security. When discussing the process of scenario-based strategies, Mr. Peterkop elaborated on
the necessity to focus on system failures rather than try to narrow down to most likely scenarios:
“We are looking at scenarios based on the systems which are the core of our digital
society, we are not looking at the threat vectors, because are too many of them.”
So policy makers do not focus on specific scenarios, but rather focus on making a detailed plan
on how to protect critical infrastructure due to the difficulty of pinpointing such specific
scenarios. There are simply too many risks to consider to be able to focus on specific types of
threats. Further more, there is also an issue with understand what is an attack, as Ms. Lillimets
explained:
“We are constantly under attack, but also what is an attack? Our networks are always
attacked or penetrated or tested for vulnerabilities.”
There is acknowledgment of the continual risk to the cyber domain, and this results in the focus
leaning away from specific threats or specific attacks. Instead, there is a mentality of needing to
be ready for anything which is created by this uncertainty:
“We’re not pointing finger and saying you are likely to attack us, we’re saying here are
the kinds of things we are worried about and here are the things we can do in order make
our system more resilient to various types of problems”
– Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ
“You need to have a holistic approach because you really don’t know what kind of
attacker you are facing and you need to have collaboration.”
– Dr. Robert Krimmer, TTÜ
“And it is harder to know if there is going to be an attack on your systems, but making
sure everyone knows their basic cyber security isn’t.”
- Pilleriin Lillemets, BDC
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Based off of these statements, we can observe several thing. Firstly, that the Estonian cyber
domain is constantly plagued by threats which are difficult to discern. Secondly, Estonian policymakers and stakeholders are aware of this blurriness and have reacted to it by focusing on a more
comprehensive approach to cyber security. This lack of focus on specific threats is something
that is not seen often, particularly when dealing with security. However, if you view this from a
risk society point of view, this is understandable and we can see that policy-makers must view
cyber risks in this manner given the nature of the domain.

Lack of Defined Actors
A contributing factor to the lack of defined threat is the lack of defined actors. There are two
levels to this: lack of defined risk actors and lack of defined security providers. This is another
feature of the borderless nature of the cyber domain detailed in chapter 1 and 2. The cyber
domain lacks the traditional boundaries in terms of sector that conventional security domains do.
This has significant consequences on cyber security, mainly that a more comprehensive approach
must be taken. The lack of defined actors operating in cyber security means that everyone is both
a risk and a security provider.
Everyone is a Risk
In cyber security everyone who uses a connected device is a potential threat to security and
therefore a risk. If Estonia is a cyber society, which is supported by policy makers statements,
then everyone in a society is digitally connected and therefore everyone is a risk. We can add this
to the already long list of risk actors explained in previous chapter: states, foreign individuals,
and groups of individuals such as terrorist groups of ‘hacktavist’ groups. The head of the Cyber
Security branch at RIA had this to say about risk actors in cyber:
“This is a big difference between cyber security and physical security: each and every
user is a possible risk, each and every entity can effect cyber security in general.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
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On a similar note, Ms. Lillemets stated:
“The biggest problem is people, the human error and the person sitting behind the desk is
the biggest cyber risk.”
The main reason that everyone behind a desk is a risk is due to both the simple risk of an
individual not knowing how to properly protect themselves in cyberspace. While not everyone
will be careless, there has to be an understanding of the potential of risk.
Beyond this acknowledgment of basic human error as a potential risk, interviewees also touched
upon the point that individuals have a heightened ability to act as threat actor as a ‘lone hacker’,
or an individual acting alone in their cybercrime. There are also groups of individuals, which
interviewees often referred to as ‘hacktavists’, both in a non-state capacity and in a statesanctioned capacity. Finally, there are state actors in this matrix. This was the most common
classification of potential threat actors, though there was discussion of how these three ‘levels’
interact and mesh. The overarching theme was that there we a great deal of potential threat actors
to Estonian national cyber security, so much so that it was not fruitful to try and identify them
and strategize specific responses to them.
Security Providers
Cyber security is also different from traditional security in terms of where security comes from
and who provides security. This is another facet of the lack of boundaries in cyber security. In
conventional security the state is the provider of security and the main actor within security.
However, due to the nature of the cyber domain this approach is not feasible, and viewing the
state as the main provider of security ignores the importance of the involvement and agency of
other actors in security. This is clearly the case with regard to Estonian national cyber security,
and was evident through interviews. The securing of Estonian cyberspace is achieved through the
public sector, the private sector and through civilians. Interviewees focused on the importance of
a bottom-up approach to cyber security, stressing the role of the private sector and the general
public. Piret Pernik, a researcher at the ICDS, elaborated on this:
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“Because of the fact that everyone owns a device [there is a] personal responsibility that
everyone has to take care of there own personal cyber security. This isn’t the case in
traditional military security where the state provides security; in this sense the
responsibility is spread.”
This shows that individuals in a society are responsible for cyber security as well, not just the
government. Mr. Peterkop also stressed the importance of a holistic approach when considering
how to secure national cyberspace:
“I think the main different between cyber security and conventional national security so
far is that approach to cyber security has to be distributed, its not a top down approach
like you have in military security.”
One of the ways that citizen are involved in the securing of cyberspace is through participation in
the Cyber Unit of the Estonian Defense League, a voluntary organization which helps monitor
cyberspace:
“People are involved through the Cyber Defense League 4 , there’s a network of IT
administrators who monitor the internet and give feedback, and that happens also on
local level…there is a lot of communication there.”
– Dr. Robert Krimmer
The Cyber Unit was mentioned often by interviewees. The emphasis on this voluntary force,
sometimes referred to a ‘cyber militia’, and its existence in the first place, shows the level to
which cyber security practices in Estonia are spread out and shared by society. The concept of a
‘militia’ is not something that has been considered integral or even useful in recent times, yet the
Estonian model for the Cyber Unit is been studied and considered as a model for other nations as
well. This shows that the involvement of civilians in cyber security is indeed different to that of
traditional security.
This is also extended towards the private sector, which plays a significant role in the
maintenance of cyber security. A large majority of critical infrastructure, such as banking, is
4

The ‘Cyber Defense League’ is the former name of the Cyber Unit of the Estonian Defense League, interviewees
sometimes referred to it as the ‘CDL’.
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actually maintained and developed by the private sector, a fact that interviewees stressed as an
important part of the necessity to consider all parts of society as upholders of security. This
means that the private sector is also a integral part of securing cyberspace and has a huge amount
of responsibility in terms of cyber security and the functioning of Estonian e-society. Mr.
Särekanno stressed this need:
“A number of risks are associated with the essential service providers in the private
sector and its up to them to make sure they have the capabilities and ability to handle
them. So it requires a lot of cooperation and mutual effort to build up a solid baseline
security.”
Mr. Särekanno touches upon an important point: that the need for multi-sector approach in cyber
security in turn creates a need for cooperation and communication. The strategy address this and
drafts policies which regulate the security measures taken by the private sector:
“There is a good cooperation because they [the private sector] need to follow security
standards. Also in law, the private sector has to implement those security measures.”
- Piret Pernik, ICDS
The private sector’s role in the securing of Estonian cyberspace is an essential part of cyber
security, and the strategy and policy reflect this in their treatment of it. Strategy and policy not
only regulate the security practices of the private sector, but also place an emphasis on
partnership and working together:
“We put a lot of emphasis in building this community and a public-private partnership”
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA
“It is extremely important that the agency [RIA] is viewed not only as a supervisor but as
a partner in cyber security.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
“[There must be] cooperation between government, private sector, and academy in order
to integrate cyber into lives of everyday citizens…cyber security should be a part of our
every day lives, I think this is the biggest change in Estonian society.”
- Madis Raaper, MEAC
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Furthermore, Mr. Peterkop also discussed the involvement of the private sector in terms of filling
in the gaps where the government is lacking:
“The government usually isn’t very good at procuring e-solutions. The private sector
delivered more than expected. Last autumn we had ID-card crisis, we need a specific
competency which we lacked, we turned to a specific company and they gave us the
technology we needed.”
– Mr. Taimar Peterkop, RIA
Other interviewees also discussed this, stating that the majority of innovation comes from the
private sector, and there is a high level of cooperation between state and private sectors in order
to maintain a functional system. Beyond this, every interviewee talked at length about the
involvement of the private sector and ‘relevant stakeholders’ and experts from various
institutions in the strategy drafting process itself:
“So currently we have four or five different workshops with different stakeholders, and I
would say that most of the key players form the community have been engaged.”
– Uku Särekanno, RIA
“We invite all research institutions, academies, universities, private sector, ministries, so
in this sense I don’t think this is very common for normal procedures.”
- Piret Perdik, ICDS
“Everybody is [involved]. We include all relevant stakeholders from public and private
sector, academia and non-profit as well.”
– Raul Rikk, EGA
One of the strongest themes from the interviews was the stress on the involvement of all
stakeholders in the policy-making process, and the important of considering everyone in terms of
practicing security. Thus we cannot explicitly label actors in Estonian cyber security regarding
who practices security, or who provides security. These sentiments expressed by interviewees
were also seen expressed in the second national cyber security strategy of Estonia. Principle 4
states that:
“Cyber security is ensured in a coordinated manner through cooperation between the
public-, private- and third sectors, taking into account the interconnectedness and
interdependence of existing infrastructure and services in cyberspace.”
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–

Estonian National Cyber Security Strategy, Principle 4

The entire society is responsible for the maintenance and security of cyberspace, and this is an
attitude that held by Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders.
Bug Bounties and Penetration Testing
A specific example of the significance of cooperation that interviewees spoke about was the
importance of penetration testing. This is along similar lines to the cyber hygiene test in
development. Instead, this service is offered by the Estonian government, RIA in particular, to
private companies in order to test the resilience and strength of their firewalls:
“We have contracts where we do penetration testing and we do it with government
funding. And the companies get very useful information regarding weaknesses in the
system, but for the government the benefit is that they essentially are doing the necessary
adjustments that are needed.”
– Uku Särekanno, RIA

Another example of this is the reserve: bug bounties. Dr. Rain Ottis described these bug bounties
and why they are unique and important:
“Most cyber incidents happen because of errors in programming, so companies offer
rewards for anyone who can find a bug and report it… This is different from a more
state-centric view, where the state has full power and everyone must work for you.”

As Dr. Ottis stressed, this concept is a very different take on conventional view of security,
where the state take full responsibility. Both the public and private sector take advantage of the
borderless nature of the cyber domain, specifically the fact that every individual takes an active
part in it. This is another way that Estonian strategy manages risk within the cyber domain.

Cyber Opportunity in Estonia
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With increased dependence on digital services and ICT, Estonia’s need for strong cyber security
increases as well. This is one of the defining traits of the cyber domain and of a risk society. I
have argued that as cyber security is best understood through a lens of risk society theory,
increased digitalization brings more risk to the cyberspace of Estonia. As Estonia is a cyber
society that keeps digitalizing and relying on these services, it is also exposing itself to more risk.
While it is enormously beneficial for Estonia to continue this process, it also creates risk and
makes the country vulnerable. It makes it vulnerable to attacks, but also to the systemic risks
which characterize and define a risk society. These systemic risks are borne out of digitalization
and created by the system, i.e. cyberspace, itself. These risks are malfunctions and malware
which come from the programming or failure of systems, and are not enacted by individual,
groups, or states. In a risk society, people are aware of these systemic risks and the reflexive
nature of modernization.
Estonian cyber security policy makers and stakeholders are aware the systemic risk which
characterize their cyber society, and the reflexive nature. Interviewees often specifically
addressed the reflexive nature of digitalization:
“We are very dependent on these things, and vulnerabilities is a nature part the bigger
the system is the more vulnerabilities there are. When we are completely reliant on these
service it can backfire at some point.”
- Pilleriin Lillemets, BDC
“Because we are so dependent on cyberspace so we are more vulnerable than other
countries.”
- Piret Pernik, ICDS
“Firstly, we are very dependent on the e-governmental services, which makes us very
vulnerable and we have to pay much more attention to cyber security than other
countries.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
“Now that there is a higher level of e-voting, that makes us more attractive to state level
attack, and we need to monitor, and RIA is doing a lot”
– Dr. Robert Krimmer, TTÜ
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This shows that cyber security experts are indeed aware of the reflexive opportunity that comes
along with advancement of ICT. Interviewees stated that cyber security was more important in
Estonia because it was advanced and reliant on these systems. Estonia’s modernization and
innovation of ICT, e-services, and e-governance also exposed it to risk it was no before. The
interviewees were aware of this face and the necessary marriage between modernization in
cyberspace and vulnerability in cyberspace.
There was also a significant amount of discussion concerning the reflexive risks which stem
from the system itself. The risks themselves are lacking the traditional ‘from whom’ actors, and
instead are systemic. Interviewees discussed these risks at lengths, stating that these systemic
risks are the most common:
“Most cyber incidents happen because of errors in programming.”
-

Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ

“If you look at stats about the incidents are reported to CERT, most are related to
malware.”
-

Uku Särekanno, RIA

Most of the risk to Estonian cyberspace is not cybercrime or cyber attacks, as some might expect,
but everyday malfunctions, or systemic risks. And Estonian policy-makers pay keen attention to
this, and are aware of this fact. In addition to awareness of the nature of these risks as systemic,
there is also a acknowledgement that these risks are the biggest threat to cyber security.
“I think that the more the discussion goes on the more it becomes about the everyday
than the big catastrophic incident.”
-

Pilleriin Lillemets, CDC

This statements shows that experts consider everyday cyber security, such as systemic risks, as
the biggest threat to cyber security in Estonia. This was a common theme discussed by
interviewees. While they acknowledged the importance of planning both for cyber attacks, small
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and large, and everyday systemic risks, there is an agreement that these systemic risks ought to
be the focus because they are the most common. This sets cyber security apart from conventional
security because large scale attacks are not considered the main risk to be dealt with. This
understanding has developed as cyber security is discussed more and more, because society
become increasingly aware of these systemic risks and adapts accordingly.
“It ended up in a way that the strategy focuses on the capabilities we need to develop in
order to cope with the modern world.”
–

Uku Särekanno, RIA

The Nature of Estonian Cyber Security Strategy and Policy
All of these characteristics of the cyber domain and the concept of risk culminate in a proactive
approach to cyber security strategy and policy. Through Beck’s risk society lens, we can
rephrase this by stating that policies possess a presence of the future. Strategy and policy cannot
be reactive in nature, especially as the culture of cyber security evolves, because of the
borderless nature of threats and actors. It must focus on preventative measures due to the
unknown factors that plagues the reflexive nature of the cyber domain. This is why there is a
significant presence of the future in strategy and policy, and why they focus on resilience and
agility. Estonian policy-makers do understand the cyber domain in a specific manner which can
be understood through risk society, particularly because they are aware of the reflexive nature of
it. Because of this, Estonian cyber security strategy expresses this understanding through
proactive policies with a significant presence of the future. Taimar Peterkop characterized
Estonian cyber security strategy as such:
“You have to be very agile and flexible and proactive in cyber security… We cannot
prepare for every scenario, in conventional, you have specific scenarios, in cyber you
have to be much more abstract.”
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The notion that strategy and policy must look towards the future was very clear from the
interviews. This is mostly shown the focus on the concept of resilience, which came off as
extremely important. All interviewees stressed the concept of resilience, and agility, as the most
important part of cyber security:
“The cyber strategy is about resilience. It has different components, but we are mostly
concerned with building resilience”
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA
“It is more about cyber resilience, specific threats are considered as well but the strategy
is more based on building capabilities.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
“We’re saying here are the kinds of things we are worried about and here are the things
we can do in order make our system more resilient to various types of problems.”
- Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ
These three statements exemplify the rationale behind resilience in cyber security. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to make a cyber security strategy or policy which focused on specific threats.
Discussion of resilience often went hand in hand with discussion about the nature of risk to cyber
security. This shows that that policy makers are more concerned with planning and risk
management than having a strategy that is specified towards threats. This shows that policymakers are aware of the nature of the risk they are dealing with as uncertain, reflexive, and never
ending. There is a big emphasis placed on the idea of alternate solutions as well in regards to
cyber resilience. Dr. Robert Krimmer described the resilience of the Estonian e-voting system:
“The whole election system is designed so that if the system is malfunctioning, you can
still cast a vote because its an advanced voting system”
– Dr. Robert Krimmer
Interviewees stated that this is the way the Estonian infrastructure and e-services have been
designed, so that if there is a failure, there will not be a failure of access to services or
information. Building alternative solutions into the system builds a resilient system that ensures
the functioning of the e-state even when something goes wrong, which Estonian policy-makers
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and stakeholder always assume will. Subgoal 1.1 of the Estonian cyber security strategy centers
around the importance of building alternative solutions.
Additionally, there was more emphasis on the importance of the role of cooperation in cyber
resilience, against stressing the borderless-ness of the cyber domain and how it translates to
strategy and policy:
“Is mostly about government, how to achieve resilience though education, cooperation
between different sectors, through academy, through raising competence and I think also
we need functioning e-state.”
- Madis Raaper, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MEAC)
“Everyone understands that there is no such thing as 100% secure device, so sooner or
later you will be hacked, so its how quickly can operate normal [functions]. You can see
this thinking in previous strategy, it was about designing resilience.”
- Piret Pernik, ICDS
Therefore building a resilient Estonian cyberspace must also consider all the relevant
stakeholders. As the cyber domain spreads across all sectors of society, there must also be a
focus on making sure that the concept of resilience is present across all of the cyber domain. The
importance of involving ‘all relevant stakeholders’ was a reoccurring theme that stuck out in all
interviews. This is something that is different from conventional understanding on security; we
would not see the same thing happening in the drafting of the Estonian National Security
Strategy.
The specific concept of risk management was also a key theme along with resilience and
preparedness. The emphasis on the risk management as being the center for cyber security
highlights the fact that cyber security is an ongoing process:
“The basic concern for us is preparedness and risk management. That’s the basic
concern. We really want the private and also public sector to assess their risks and do the
proper adjustments in line with assessments.”
– Uku Sarekanno, RIA
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“[This is] why alternative are important and the system needs to be resilient enough to
withstand attacks if they might have. This is what we are aiming for, not to say no to
technology but to manage the risks.”
– Taimar Peterkop, RIA
This statement in particular specifically indicates the awareness of the risks that come from
modernization. Policy-makers and stakeholders are aware that innovation breeds more risk, but
rather than curtail modernization of the cyber, they chose to move forward in a way which
manages these risks that are produced. This is what cyber security is to Estonia, the management
of the risks which are produced by the cyber domain. The idea of managing also implies the
continuity of risk in the cyber domain. Cyber security must be the management of risks because
there will always be risks:
“It is something that has been planned for and you engage the relevant parties from
private and public sector, and you through it and survive because there is no way,
absolutely no way, of building a 100% secure system. If you have to plan for partial
failure and this is normal.”
– Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ
“When it comes to do with what to do in order to protect their computers, and personal
data, they might understand the threat, but there is a continuous need to improve the skill
on what to do exactly.”
– Mr. Raul Rikk, EGA
Estonian cyber security strategy is much more focused on building a resilient and agile system
over all then focusing on specific threats. This is because of the nature of the cyber domain as
one which is borderless and reflexive. Estonian policy-makers understand that strategy must
focus on managing the risks due to the reflexive nature of these risks, i.e. system risks, and the
fact that continued innovation will also continue to produce more risks. Estonia has taken the
stance that cyber strategy must be prepared for the unknown risks and threats they will face in
the future, rather than one which safeguards against the threats they have faced in the past.
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ID-Card Crisis
One example of the nature of the Estonian system which displays these attributes is the ID-card
crisis of 2017. The National ID-card of Estonia, which is mandatory for all citizens, is the
foundation of the e-service system. Voting, banking, and government services revolve around the
ID-card, which is based off a electronic chip. In 2017, the security of the system was called into
question when a vulnerability was found it the software, potentially exposing citizens to identity
theft. This was a topic which came up frequently in interviews, and, surprisingly, was treated as a
positive thing:
“We needed an id crisis like this, because it showed that our government is able to react
quickly and effectively. It also automatically enhances the level of trust in e-society and
in government. Trust in governments fluctuates, trust is e society doesn’t fade away.”
– Madis Raaper, MEAC
This positive spin on the crisis is founded in the idea that this vulnerability was brought to the
attention of the government before it was a major issue. And indeed, it was fixed before any
citizen’s information was exposed or stolen. This was also expressed by Mr. Alatalu of the
CCDCOE:
“It was a good thing to be exposed to it before any damage was done.”
Likewise, Dr. Ottis spoke about the incident as being a successful demonstration of the agility of
the Estonian system, and the important of alternative solutions in a situation such as this:
“Last year we had a problem with the ID card, one way to solve this would have been to
say: ‘ok we have problems with the ID-card so we’ll temporarily move to Mobiil-ID.’”

The attitude that experts took towards the crisis shows the underlying attitude towards cyber
security as a whole in Estonia. It is better to be prepared for anything, so that the system will be
able to adapt quickly in order to fix an unexpected issue. This was the case with the ID-card
crisis. A system which expects failure is able to handle it better than a system which does not.
The ID-card crisis is an important example for another reason, in that the solution was presented
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to the Estonian government by a private company. Interviewees explained that an IT company
approached the RIA on its own in order to suggest a possible solution to the vulnerability. This
shows the importance of the cooperation between the public and private sector when it comes to
cyber security.

Role of Education and Cyber Awareness
There are many methods of building up cyber resilience, however one method which sticks out
as both very important and indicative of the borderless nature of cyber security: the role of
education and cyber awareness. The stress that is put on the importance of cyber awareness of
the entire society reiterates the fact that cyber security must involved all sectors. I have already
discussed the importance that cyber experts placed on the role of individuals in securing
cyberspace, now I discuss the way it is dealt with in strategy and policy.
One of the key terms here is cyber hygiene, which refers to basic digital security for the
individual. Dr. Rain Ottis describes it as such:
“Cyber hygiene is cyber equivalent of brushing your teeth; it should be possible for
everyone. Anyone who is able to pick up an iPad, and do something there should also be
able to get a bit more aware of cyber threats and basic security best practice.”
- Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ
So here we see that there is a clear idea that anyone and everyone should be able to practice basic
cyber security practices, and that this is something that can be expected in a cyber society such as
Estonia. To implement this, policy makers stress the importance of starting at the base of society
again, and focusing on a bottom-up approach:
“I think we should start from grassroots level, and we should go to school system. I think
step one is, and I am not saying this will be included in new strategy but it will pan out
eventually, I think there will be certain cyber hygiene course for elementary school kids”
- Madis Raaper, MEAC
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“With the campaigns and cyber hygiene testing and basic teachings in school that’s the
way we try to handle it.”
- Uku Särekanno, RIA
So there is a importance placed on implementing these awareness measures at the starting point
of society, schools. This is built off of the recognition that individuals pose a risk to cyber
security discussed earlier. As individuals are both risks and also directly involved and connected
to the cyber domain, they must be considered in strategy. Interviewees stated that schools was a
focus of this, and that this focus would continue to grow in the future strategies. However this
extends outside of schools as well:
“I think that the…we could increase our own cyber security and decrease the
vulnerabilities when we educate everyone from my grandma to my prime
minister…because it is sometimes the easier things you can do for your own cyber
hygiene that can prevent bigger things from happening.”
- Pilleriin Lillements, BDC
In regards to the military education course at the Baltic Defence College, Pilleriin Lillemets
discussed the process of training all student in very basic cyber security practices, and also the
role of the cyber hygiene test:
“All the students who come in have to take the cyber hygiene test, and this is where it
starts.”
Similarly, Mr. Särekanno discussed the development of program designed to help individuals
assess their security practices:
“Speaking about cyber hygiene, we are putting more and more effort into this. We are
currently testing and piloting a system which people can test their own cyber security
skills and assess your cyber habits.”
– Uku Särekanno, RIA
Again this shows the importance of every individual in Estonian society to be at the very least
educated and informed on basic cyber security. The emphasis on cyber hygiene and education is
one way in which Estonian cyber security strategy manages risk. There was an understanding
amongst interviewees that cyber hygiene and basic awareness of the population concerning cyber
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security practice could prevent future incidents from happening and disrupting the functioning of
Estonian cyber society. Once again, we can see that this was translated into the second strategy.
Principle 5 states that “cyber security starts with individual responsibility for safe use of ICT
tools”. The role of raising awareness is a constant theme through the strategy, and is specifically
addressed in several of the subgoals (Estonian NCSS). In this way we can see that Estonian
policy-makers and stakeholders focus on managing the risks posed to the cyber domain by the
involvement of individuals, and explicitly stated that this could prevent future incidents.
The Attribution Issue
The act of attributing attacks is another issue that was discussed by interviewees. There were
several component to this issue. One issue was simply that it was difficult to attribute attacks,
given the nature of the cyber domain. It was stressed that not only was it difficult, but that
Estonia rarely had the resources to spare in what it a lengthy and expensive process. This was
especially due to lack of manpower. Dr. Rain Ottis stressed this heavily:
“But in most cases today if you have a serious opponent you are going to have trouble
identifying you are under attack, let alone attributing.”
“Coming back to strategy, especially smaller countries like Estonia, to some degree
strategy must be agnostic in terms of who is attacking us. We very rarely have resources
to attribute attack. Even if we do attribute to state actor, realistic what can we do? We
can only talk about it in international forums.”
This particularly was stressed by technical and defense experts, who discussed the more practical
issues of attribution. Ms. Lillemets also elaborated that there were political concerning in
attributing, even if you are able to successfully attribute:
“In the 2007 attack, some politicians said it was Russia but officially did not attribute to
Russia. When you do this you can trace it, and then consider whether you want to name
the person, because when you do you reveal the extent of your capabilities.”
She went on to state that when a state does reveal the extent of their abilities, they face the
possibility of opening themselves up to further targeting. This is another aspect of the reflexive
opportunity that is presence in the cyber domain and influences the handling of cyber security.
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There was an understanding that because Estonia is a cyber society, this attracts negative
attention in the form of cyber attacks and cyber crime, whether state sanctioned or not.
Another aspect to the attribution problem that was very clear was the apparent lack of necessity
for it. When this topic came up and interviewees were asked to elaborate, they did not imply that
attribution was a main concern when it came to Estonian cyber security:
“You don’t need to know exactly who is behind the threat, because the threat can come
from around the world, you can’t possibly identify all the threat sources or threat
vectors…what you can do is protect your systems so that whoever is behind the attack or
whatever might happen, if you keep in mind these aspects you are more or less are safe.”
– Raul Rikk, EGA
The sentiment shown by Mr. Rikk’s statement exemplifies the understanding that the knowledge
of who is attacking you from where does not help in the actual protecting of systems. This is
because the Estonian mindset when it comes to cyber security is that you must assume someone
is always trying to attack you, so you must instead be ready at all times. Ms. Lillemets also
showed this sentiment:
“It is harder to know if there is going to be an attack on your systems, but making sure
everyone knows their basic cyber security isn’t.”
Estonian experts were less concerned with the who and why than with the issue of resilience and
preparedness. This is clearly shown in their emphasis on resilience and building an agile system
that can withstand a multitude of attacks and problems. This is a response to the nature of the
cyber domain, and the lack of clear threat that is presence. Estonian policy-makers had to focus
on building a system which was resilient to withstand a number of attack, and in essence be
ready for whatever the future might bring, because there was an inability to know what attacks
were coming.

Evolution of Policies
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Interviewees also made a point to discuss the evolution of the national cyber security strategy of
Estonia, saying that strategy has gone from one which was a reaction to the 2007 attack to one
which is more forward looking:
“In our case it all started in 2007, from point of view of strategy planning it was quite a
security matter for us, the cyber attacks…The first one addressed security framework, the
next one was focused on upgrade, and enhanced early warning, resilience, awareness,
and now were are preparing third one.”
– Uku Särekanno, RIA
“I think our first strategy was more reactive, but now the new one is more proactive, we
are looking at possibilities if we cannot do it. And what will happen if we fail to meet
these goals, basically we are forward looking.”
– Madis Raaper , MEAC
Here we see a progression in the cyber security strategies from being reactive to being proactive.
Estonian experts and policy-makers initially acted due to the 2007 attacks, but as the cyber
security of Estonian began to be taken more seriously, there was a deeper understanding of the
nature of the cyber domain that flourished. The understanding of the cyber domain has pushed
Estonian policy-makers to take cyber security strategy down a different road than conventional
security strategies have take. This has been the case with the second strategy and this trend will
continue with the third strategy, which has yet to be published:
“The thing is we are drafting third strategy and what we did different is we included
everyone who is someone in cyber, including private sector, IT companies, other
government institutions, and university, absolutely, and we had seminar and they gave us
their input and they gave us their feedback.”
– Madis Raaper
Mr. Alatalu described the first cyber security strategy as being very concerned with the aftermath
of the 2007 attack, but then that the next strategy had been more focused on building skills and
resilience in the system. The third strategy, he says, is even more forward looking, looking
“beyond the horizon”, and focuses on issues such as artificial intelligence and data leaks, as well
as focusing on broader question such as how society works through cyber. Estonian policymakers are striving to improve the already high level of security integration with the next
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strategy. Not only are they involving more and more relevant parties, but they are also trying to
consider more possible areas to consider in strategy, areas of development that will produce
unknown risks.
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Conclusions
To conclude this paper, I will summarize my arguments and the outcomes of the empirical case
study. I will give an overview of my characterization of the cyber domain along with the
theoretical framework with which I explain the understand of cyber security. I will then give a
final conclusion for the case of Estonian cyber security discourse, stating the overall findings of
my research.
I have argued that the understanding and functioning of security in the domain of cyberspace is
fundamentally different to that of conventional military security. The cyber domain is
differentiated from traditional domains of security by its borderless nature, the reflexive risk
which dictates cyber opportunity, and the proactive nature of its strategies and policies. These
characteristics cannot be adequately understood by conventional security theory, but can be
explained by Beck’s theory on risk society. The borderless features of the cyber domain is
characteristic of the blurring of traditional borders which is seen in a risk society. These
disappearing borders include defined threats and defined actors, in terms of threat actors and
security providers. This is also seen in the lack of physically boundaries in the cyber domain, and
the difficulty of setting national borders. Lastly, cyberspace encompasses all sectors of society:
public, private, and civilian.
The cyber domain is also governed by the reflexive nature of its innovation and advances. The
risks are self-generated, and the more a society continues to advance the more at risk it is. This is
one of the defining features of the cyber domain. The main security risks are not from outside
actor, but from the modern institutions which society has created. This reflexive nature and the
importance of systemic risks is overlooked when considering the cyber domain from a traditional
understanding of security, in which threats have very strictly defined actors and objects.
However, by looking at the cyber domain from a risk society understanding, we can see that
these systemic risks are characteristics of new modernity, which is reflexive due to our continued
advancements. Without the creation of cyberspace and e-society, there would be no risk.
However, it is the awareness of this reflexive nature which has changed the way the cyber
security is understood and dealt with. This awareness has a profound effect on the direction of
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cyber security strategy, making strategy proactive rather than reactive. This is because of the
nature of the cyber domain, which prevents society from being about to predict what threats we
might face. This is why cyber security strategy focuses on resilience and agility, so that it might
be prepared for the onslaught of systemic risks and unknown threats that it faces every day. This
focus on resilience and agility is an example of the presence of the future as explained by risk
society theory. Due to the awareness of the nature of the cyber domain, policy-makers focus
cyber security strategy on preparedness because of this ever-present risk.
The understanding of the cyber domain by Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders is consistent
with this analysis in several ways. Firstly, cyber security is seen as being borderless. Experts
both stated that it is difficult to differentiate what is national cyber security because it quickly
becomes global. Likewise, there is a difficulty of pinpointing specific threats. Cyber security
stands apart from traditional security because policy makers and stake holders are unable to
predict threats and plan accordingly. There is an understanding that there are too many risks in
the cyber realm. Rather than focus on specific scenarios, cyber security must focus on planning
for system failure and making secure that the critical infrastructure is resilient. We can see and
understanding that this is the way policy-makers view risk and the cyber domain through
adopting risk society theory as a means of analysis. Estonian cyber security strategy does not
attempt to classify and identify all the threat vectors, nor does it monopolize the practicing of
cyber security in Estonia, and we can understand why when we look at their actions and words
through this specific theoretical lens.
Estonian cyber security experts are aware of the reflexive nature of the risks in cyberspace.
Policy makers do not view cyber security as a goal that can be achieved, it is an ongoing process
of risk management rather than securing totally. This understanding is seen in the nature of
Estonia cyber security policy and strategies, which focus on resilience and agility of Estonian
cyberspace. These strategies are proactive in nature rather than reactive, and have a significant
presence of the future in that they seek to be ready for unknown risks. This is evident in the large
amount of importance that Estonian policy makers place on cyber awareness and education, and
through their concept of cyber hygiene. This aids in the ongoing process of cyber resilience by
attempting to manage the risks that are created by everyday users.
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The understanding of cyber security by Estonian policy makers and stake holders coincides with
that of a risk society, and we can understand their departure from conventional approach and
treatment of security to a more risk-based and resilience-based approach. Experts characterize
the cyber domain as borderless, and differentiate cyber security from ‘conventional security’, and
this has a significant impact on the nature of strategies and policies. Perhaps most importantly,
Estonian experts are aware of the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity and the systemic risk
which dictates the domain. This awareness is what makes a risk society a risk society, and what
guides Estonian cyber security strategy and policy down a proactive path rather then a reactive
path. By looking at the cyber domain and the treatment of cyber security through this lens, we
can understand why policy-makers and stakeholder conceptualized cyber risk and security in the
way that they do.

67
REFERENCES
References
Areng, Liina. Lilliputian States in Digital Affairs and Cyber Security. CCDCOE, 11 June 2015,
ccdcoe.org/multimedia/lilliputian-states-digital-affairs-and-cyber-security.html.
Bajerova, Alzbèta. “Impact on NATO of Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations.” 2017. NATO
CCD COE Publishing.
Beck, U. (2001) World Risk Society (London: Blackwell).
Beck, U. (1995) Risk Society; Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (Cambridge: Polity).
Beck, U. (1994) ‘The Reinvention of Politics’, in Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, Tradition
and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage).
Beck, Ulrich, et al. “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization.” Theory, Culture & Society, vol.
20, no. 2, 2003, pp. 1–33., doi:10.1177/0263276403020002001.
Brangetto, Pascal, and Mari Kert-Saint Aubyn. “Economic Aspects of National Cyber Security
Strategies.” CCDCOE, 10 June 2016

Cavelty, Myriam Dunn. “From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an
Impact in the Cyber-Security Discourse.” International Studies Review, Wiley/Blackwell
(10.1111), 10 Apr. 2013,

68
Czosseck, Christian, et al. “Estonia after the 2007 Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic and
Organisational Changes in Cyber Security.” International Journal of Cyber Warfare and
Terrorism (IJCWT), IGI Global, 1 Jan. 2011
Deibert, Ronald & Rohozinski, Rafal. (2010). ‘Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of
Cyberspace Security’. International Political Sociology. 4. 15 - 32.
Elbe, S. (2008) ‘Risking Lives: AIDS, Security and Three Concepts of Risk’, Security Dialogue
39(2–3): 177– 198.
Estonian National Cyber Security Strategy 2014 – 2018. Available at:
https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/cyber_security_strategy_2014-2017_public_version.pdf
‘E-stonia Facts’. Available at: https://e-estonia.com/wp-content/uploads/updated-factsestonia.pdf
Geers, Kenneth (2009) ‘The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures: Beyond Theory’,
Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 18:1, 1-7, DOI:
10.1080/19393550802676097
Hansen, Lene, and Helen Nissenbaum. “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen
School.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 4, 2009, pp. 1155–1175.,
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00572.x.
Harknett, Richard & A. Stever, James. (2009). ‘The Cybersecurity Triad: Government, Private
Sector Partners, and the Engaged Cybersecurity Citizen’. Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management.
Heng, Y.-K. (2006) ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate: Through the Looking Glass of Ulrich
Beck’s World Risk Society’, International Relations, vol. 20, no. 1 , pp. 69-91.

69
ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 27002: code of practice for information security management 2005.
Deibert, R. J. and Rohozinski, R. (2010), Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of
Cyberspace Security. International Political Sociology, 4: 15-32.
Krahmann, E. (2010) ‘Beck and Beyond: Selling Security in the World Risk Society’, Review of
International Studies 36(3): 1-20.
Nyman Metcalf, Katrin. “A Legal View on Outer Space and Cyberspace: Similarities and
Differences.” CCDCOE, 21 Feb. 2018
Nissenbaum, Helen. “Where Computer Security Meets National Security.” Ethics and
Information Technology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
Ottis, Rain, et al. Cyber Society and Cooperative Cyber Defence. CCDCOE, 16 June 2015.
Osula, Anna-Maria, and Kadri Kaska. “National Cyber Security Strategy Guidelines.” 2013.
NATO CCD COE Publishing.
O'Connell, Mary E. “Cyber Security without Cyber War.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law,
vol. 17, no. 2, 2012, pp. 187–209., doi:10.1093/jcsl/krs017.
Rasmussen, M.V. (2001) ‘Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society’,
Millennium 30(2): 285- 309.
Rasmussen, M.V. (2004) ‘“It Sounds Like a Riddle”: Security Studies, the War on Terror and
Risk’, Millennium 33(2): 381-395.
Schmitt, Michael N., and Liis Vihul. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

70
Schmitt, Michael, and Liis Vihul. The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms. CCDCOE, 31
Dec. 2014.
Tikk, Eneken. “Ten Rules for Cyber Security.” Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, 2011, pp. 119–132.,
doi:10.1080/00396338.2011.571016.
Von Solms, Rossouw, and Johan van Niekerk. “From Information Security to Cyber Security.”
Computers & Security, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 29 Apr. 2013
Williams, M.J. (2008) ‘(In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society’,
Cooperation and Conflict 43(1): 57–79.

71

I, _______________________________________________________________________
(author’s name)
(personal code _________________________________________________),
herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________,
(title of thesis)
supervised by _________________________________________________________,
(supervisor’s name)

1. To reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public,
including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of
the copyright.
2. To make available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu,
including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity of the
copyright.
3. I am aware that the rights stated in point 1 also remain with the author.
4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual
property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act.

Tartu, ______________ (date)
______________________________________ (signature)

